The latest events in the Strait of Hormuz portend a rise in international tensions. But Trump has already made it clear that he is ready for a negotiation with Tehran, and Iran needs not to close regardless. The latest Iranian actions can be a useful tool for a long-term strategy, to get to the negotiating table in a situation that is not too unfavorable. The in-depth analysis taken from geopolitica.info
On 19 July, in the Strait of Hormuz, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards seized a British tanker with 23 crewmen, the Stena Impero of the Stena Bulk company. The tanker is currently anchored in the Iranian port of Band Abbas.
According to the latest reconstructions, the Pasdaran would have communicated a request for an inspection to the tanker, for safety reasons. At the refusal by a British officer, who was on board a frigate, the Montrose, while patrolling the area, justified by the passage of the boat in an international strait, several Iranian patrol boats surrounded the tanker, and at the same time a unit of the Iranian military aboard the Stena from a helicopter, taking control of the ship.
The British Foreign Minister, Jeremy Hunt, has asked Tehran to stop the “illegal” seizure of the ship, threatening retaliatory actions against Iran. THE AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW …
The episode is part of a picture of growing instability in the Middle East, in particular in the area of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, the natural border that divides the two main rivals in the Middle East region, Iran and Saudi Arabia. And it fits into the conflict pattern between the Trump administration and Iran, which began since the inauguration of the last president of the United States, as evidenced by the National Strategy Security of December 2017, Washington’s unilateral exit from the JCPOA and the implementation of new economic sanctions against Tehran.
A large part of international analysts see Trump as willing to set a new balance in the Middle East that does not involve a significant role for Iran. Some analysts even predict an increase in the escalation in the medium term involving a conflict between the US and Iran, with a consequent regime change in Tehran. A vision that finds consensus, but which should be analyzed in depth to notice inconsistencies that undermine its solidity.
Trump, in the media, has often attacked the current Iranian institutional system, and black and white has described Iran as a “sponsoring state of terrorism in the world” (NSS ’17), and the main enemy of American interests in the Middle East, as well of jihadist ideology. THE WILL TO TREAT
Some facts, however, seem to bring to light the desire to reach a new agreement with the Iranian counterpart. Agreement capable of leading on the one hand to a slowdown in the missile development of Tehran, the flagship of the country when compared with the reference regional system, and on the other to the interruption of the financing of the various militias that respond to Iran in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, another strong point of Iran’s asymmetric military strategy.
First of all, as a reference, it should be remembered the climate of very high tension recorded between the US and North Korea at the beginning of Trump’s mandate, when the escalation seemed inevitable: all in reality and served to both parties to get to confront each other on a negotiation table, still open, but which seems to yield important results in terms of stabilization of the area.
The same pattern could be repeated with Iran, and there are some episodes that seem to be heading in that direction. One of these sees, at the beginning of May, the meeting in Baghdad between Pompeo and senior representatives of Iraqi institutions: according to various sources present at the table, Pompeo would have declared that the US is ready to open a new round of negotiations on the JCPOA, fearing the hypothesis to include an additional article including US requests on missile tests and terrorist financing in the region.
At the end of May, on several occasions, Trump opened the dialogue, declaring the willingness of the United States to negotiate, and placing as an absolute veto, as the only indispensable condition, the halt to the development of nuclear weapons of the Iranian counterpart. In an interview with Good Morning Britain, in early June, Trump revealed the possibility of a military option against Tehran, present on the table, but reiterated that he much prefers dialogue and the opening of negotiations for a new agreement.
These declarations have alternated in recent weeks with rumors that a plan was ready to send thousands of new American troops to the Middle East. And to the public statements of the head of the Pentagon Shahanan, on the sending of 1000 men to the region in an anti-Iranian key, Trump responded by dismissing the latter, replacing him with Mark Esper.
On 20 June, then, one of the episodes that brought the level of tension to its highest point in recent months: an American drone was shot down by the Iranian counter-area near the Strait of Hormuz. In the night between 20 and 21, according to what was reconstructed by the New York Times and NewsWeek, the cruiser Uss Leyte Gulf, present in the Persian Gulf, had received the alert to hit Iranian positions within an hour: the plan of ‘ action, on the other hand, was interrupted in progress, signaling a rift inside the White House. A large part of the administration agreed to forceful action, the Pentagon’s top executives and Trump himself opposed. According to Reuters, moreover, also during the night Trump would have sent a communication to Oman, to be delivered to Iran,
Always in a pattern of alternating between pressure measurements and breezy hypotheses of openings, after the episode of the drone and the potential US attack, at the end of June Trump communicated on the one hand, via Twitter, that the requests to Iran are “none nuclear weapon and an end to terrorism ”, and that countries should be able to autonomously protect their boats in Hormuz, and on the other hand it has launched specific economic sanctions against Ayatollah Khomeini. THE (WEAK) IRANIAN VET
Officially Tehran closes all possible negotiations. Khomeini does it repeatedly, the prominent members of the Pasdaran and the more conservative wing of Parliament do it. The head of diplomacy Zarif and President Rohani also do so, albeit with less vigor, exponents of that wing that instead sought dialogue with the United States and Europe, and both protagonists of the 2015 nuclear agreement.
The declarations, however, seem to be more of a facade than pondered on a real national interest: Iran hoped to be able to count on the full support of the European Union in respecting the nuclear agreement, also in light of the differences of the main European chancelleries. with the Trump administration. But this European support did not go beyond superficial statements on the importance of the agreement and Trump’s strategic mistake in the unilateral exit, and the “Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges” (INSTEX) itself, an instrument to support trade trade created in January 2019 by France, Germany and the United Kingdom to facilitate the trade of non-US dollars with Iran, currently does not guarantee the necessary guarantees for Tehran.
As easily predictable, the US exit has changed the status quo, and Iran needs an alternative strategy: the burden of sanctions is unsustainable for the already fragile Iranian economy, which in less than 4 years has returned to being reliable international interlocutor to an enemy state for the stabilization of the Middle East.
The Iranian wing destined to keep open the channels of dialogue, direct or otherwise, with the United States, must deal with a large part of the political, institutional and religious system opposed to the Trump administration, in light of the “unilateral betrayal” of the agreements made in the time of Obama. ACTIONS IN THE STRAIT AS A DEMONSTRATION OF STRENGTH
In addition, in recent months, Iran has launched a series of actions, military and political, in response to pressure from the United States and capable of increasing its weight in a possible future negotiation with Washington.
In the Strait of Hormuz, several episodes, such as the shooting down of the US drone, the sabotage of Japanese oil tankers (although officially denied by Tehran), and lastly the capture of the British tanker, are part of a very specific strategy: Iran proves to be able to leverage one of its main strengths, namely the control of the Strait of Hormuz.
This is one of the main checkpoints of world trade: 17 million barrels of crude oil pass through the strait per day, equal to about 20% of the world trade in oil 318. The dimensions of the strait are very small: 33 kilometers wide at the narrowest point and 95 at the widest point. In addition to these measures, already minimal in themselves, the width of the navigation routes allowed by the depth of the waters are reduced to a band about 2 kilometers wide, which make the control of the strait relatively simple. Over the course of recent history, Tehran has threatened to close access to the strait: this, of course, would have significant consequences on the entire world trade, due to the forced use of secondary (land) routes for oil trafficking, which would be slower and more expensive. For the United States, a closure of the strait would be a declaration of war, a red line that Iran cannot afford to cross. Given the overt impossibility, and the extreme risk of closing the strait, Iran with the latest actions is proving to be able to transfer instability in the area, highlighting its projection capacity on one of the main world sea routes, and revealing a difficulty in the response of the international community to the aforementioned actions.
Combined with this factor, Iran continues to carry out pressure actions on the United States: in recent days it has announced that it has arrested 17 alleged American spies, trained by the CIA, on its territory. It also communicated to prepare the necessary tools to reduce its obligations under the 2015 nuclear agreement, increasing the level of enrichment of uranium from the 3.67% established by the agreement. A factor which, if weighted with the continuous declarations of the opposition to the atomic bomb repeated by the Supreme Guide Khamenei, actually represents an instrument of pressure to be used in a negotiation with Washington, given the condition of absolute veto by Trump on Iranian nuclear power.
A starting point that allows Iran to present itself at a possible negotiating table in a position that is as advantageous as possible. EVIDENCE OF THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN
Not to be underestimated, in the last instance, the words spoken a few days ago to the New York Times by Ahmadinejad, former conservative president and still with a large following in Iran. Words that open up the negotiation: “Trump is a businessman and therefore he is able to calculate the cost-benefits and make a decision. We tell them ‘we calculate the long-term cost-benefit of our two nations and we are not shortsighted’ ”. A negotiation that, according to Ahmadinejad, can only start if the US administration decides to loosen the grip of sanctions as proof of a willingness to open up to dialogue.
It is difficult to know if these statements can be somehow representative of the conservative wing of the country, or if simply the former Iranian president is only trying to present himself to the West in a new, more dialoguing light, to sweep away the image. as a fundamentalist he had created during his years of government. What is certain is that during the last presidential election in Iran, Ahmadinejad was prevented from running as a candidate by the Guardian Council, an order placed to guarantee the preservation of the Islamic system and closely linked to the Supreme Guide: news that it had highlighted a rift within the conservatives, but which could now prove important for future political scenarios within the country. THE SCENARIOS
Both sides, covertly or not, have the will or the obligation to negotiate, but the future trajectory that can be traced in the light of the latest events is that of an increase in instability, at least in the short term. At the European level it was proposed to establish a mission to protect ships in the Persian Gulf, and the British government could decide to implement economic sanctions against Iran.
The United States, on the other hand, as Pompeo communicated to England, does not seem to have any intention of engaging in a mission to protect the strait, and shows a willingness to deal with Tehran on the basis of two conditions: no to arms. nuclear power and the “stop to the financing of terrorism”.
Iran is in a position of waiting, probably for the new American elections, but Rohani and Zarif have made it clear that the interruption of sanctions is the sine qua non that allows the opening of a negotiation. And the declarations of Rohani of today, July 24, reported by Al-Jazeera, clearly open the table: But the declarations of Rohani, reported by Al-Jazeera on July 24, clearly open to a negotiation: “we have never lost a ‘ opportunities for negotiations and dialogue and we will not lose any opportunities in the future. We are ready to start fair and logical negotiations, but negotiating does not mean giving up ”.
Although the events of recent months are worrying for an escalation of violence capable of destabilizing the entire region, the main actors in the field have no intention of opening a conflict, and the waltz of diplomacy, conventional or not, could bring surprises. in the long run.
Article published on geopolitica.info
