Extract from the paper “The religious and geopolitical rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East” by Francesca Manenti and Lorenzo Marinone del Cesi
The match to fill the full and empty power in the Middle East between Iran and Saudi Arabia could assist at the inauguration of a readjustment phase in the near future. The developments that are going through or that are emerging on the horizon of this region, in fact, could question what the two rivals have built up to now.
A first major question mark was raised by the death of General Suleimani during a US-led air strike on Baghdad airport in early January. The elimination of Commander Pasdaran, killed together with the deputy commander of the Iraqi People’s Mobilization Forces, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, has posed the problem for Tehran of finding a solution to fill the void and ensure the solidity of the network of alliances woven by Suleimani in the over the past two decades. Despite the fact that the Supreme Guide, Ali Khamenei, has promptly appointed the new chain of command of the Qods Force, substantial uncertainty continues to hover over the actual possibility for the new leaders to successfully collect the legacy of Suleimani.
First of all, because the new commander, Esmail Qaani, has always dealt with the activities of the Qods Force on the western side (Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia). The absence from a theater as complicated as the Middle East, to which it would seem to be added the lack of knowledge of the Arabic language, risks making the General a not very charismatic figure in the eyes of that panoply that is the set of Shiite militias. The eventual inability of Qaani to take the reins of the post-Suleimani could lead to the fragmentation of the Shiite blocs along faults defined by their respective special interests, which may not necessarily coincide with Tehran’s priorities in the different countries.
This trend, in fact, is already beginning to be evident in Iraq, where Iranian-supported groups have shown growing divergence among themselves on the redefinition of internal weights after al-Muhandis’ death. To try to avoid a chalking that could turn into a weakening of its ability to influence, Iran seems to be willing to resort to the old guard of regional proxies and to try to use their symbolic weight within the Shiite revolutionary world to re-tighten the ranks around the Islamic Republic. At a time when the solidity of the Iranian network of influence could be at risk, Tehran is trying to leverage once again the sense of communitarianism within the Shiite world to try to regain the ranks of its own axis of resistance.
Furthermore, this transition phase could be used by the Iranian authorities to try to create a new balance with regional allies, in which Tehran continues to be the central pivot of the Shiite bloc, but local groups increasingly acquire an identity of their own. Following the example of what happened with the Lebanese Party of God, this would allow Iran to lighten the economic investment towards its neighbors and bring to maturity the political alliance with subjects who would no longer obey the orders of Tehran due to economic opportunity, but for political agreement. In the eyes of Iran, this evolution would represent an important strategic advantage,
This would allow the Iranian government to be able to use these resources to manage new crises, even within the country. At a time when the health emergency unleashed by the Covid-19 pandemic and the weight of US sanctions outline a rather complicated scenario for internal stability within Iran, this solution would allow Tehran not to waste the political capital built in the last twenty ‘years. However, a relaxation of the reins by Tehran could turn into a demand for greater autonomy, especially on the part of the new generations of militants, who have joined the architecture created by Iran for political opportunity and internal agenda rather than for an actual sharing of ideals and ideology embodied by the Islamic Republic or its revolutionary message.
Furthermore, the strength and geometry of the Iranian influence arc are strongly linked to a second unknown that stands out against the background of the future of equilibrium in the Middle East and which is linked to the succession at the top of the two schools of Najaf and Qom. With the passing of the age of both Ayatollah Sistani and Khamenei, in fact, the question of future appointments becomes more and more pressing, which will inevitably influence the balance between the theological schools. If the handover at the top of the Islamic Republic could hardly lead to a drastic internal change in the Iranian system, the more decisive will be the change in the Iraqi sacred city. The leader of the Najaf seminary, in fact, continues to play a fundamental role within the Shiite community, especially Iraqi. In recent years Sistani has always proved to be a particularly pragmatic actor, interested in finding a point of convergence between his own ideas and the interests of his Iranian neighbor. However, the great following in the management of the post-Saddam transition phase in the early 2000s and, subsequently, in the call to arms of the Shiite population against the advance of Daesh in the country has clearly highlighted the extent of the influence exerted by the summit. of the school of Najaf for the balance of the region. Within this framework, succession is a priority issue for Tehran. Since the appointment of the future Najaf summit, in fact, will depend on the ease with which the Islamic Republic will be able to stir the consciences even of those Shiite communities hitherto little fascinated by the call of the Khomeinist revolution. If Iran were to manage the transition and favor the appointment of an ayatollah close to its positions, it would in fact break down the curtain of dissent within Shiism and increase the chances of extending its radiant influence in the Middle East.
This opportunity would become particularly significant at a time when the region is shaken by new popular demonstrations that ask their ruling classes for a change in a nationalist sense. From Lebanon to Iraq, in fact, in recent months crowds have taken to the streets to protest against the interference of external actors in internal politics and to claim the will to start a new season of social inclusiveness, in which national identity can to be the trait d’union between the different ethnic and religious communities. The Islamic Republic is no longer perceived as a revolutionary element, but, on the contrary, as one of the actors responsible for the continuing instability within the two countries. The secular spirit of the protests, in fact, it eliminates the religious element on which the export of the Iranian experience was based and which allowed Iran to build the Shiite arch as it appears today. The desire to define national identity on a secular basis, inclusive of all the requests brought forward by the various ethnic-religious communities and able to define their own strategic interests independently, risks making the Shiite model promoted by the Pasdaran a foreign element. to the new political and social order of neighboring countries.
The social change underlying the demands of the streets thus risks making the Tehran government the bulwark no longer of the revolution but of the Islamic reaction. The entrances guaranteed by proxies into the Lebanese and Iraqi political systems could become the symbol of an influence that is not only no longer considered legitimate, but even deleterious for the accomplishment of the transformation underway in the two countries. This in a clear downsizing of the sphere of influence of the Islamic Republic in the region and, with it, the solidity of the Shiite resistance arc on which Iran has based its rise to regional power. In this context, should the handover to Najaf lead to the appointment of a Grand Ayatollah critical of Iranian doctrine,
On closer inspection, the issue of dualism between the schools of Qom and Najaf is absolutely central also in determining the posture of Riyadh and, therefore, the future trajectory of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In fact, from the Saudi point of view, a possible succession to Sistani in favor of Tehran, and therefore an affirmation of the velayat-e faqih in Najaf, presents two possible levels of criticality.
The first relates to the profound echo that this evolution could have among the Shiite populations, especially those who live in the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. In fact, both the Shiite majority of Bahrain, and the minority present in Saudi territory and concentrated in the eastern province, are traditionally loyal to the Najaf school. In this sense, the succession to Sistani is seen by Riyadh almost as an internal matter and certainly as a dossier of the utmost delicacy for the stability of the Kingdom and the neighbors of the Peninsula.
The second order of criticality concerns the possible impact on the Saudi interpretation of regional balances. A pro-Tehran Najaf would do away with any possibility for Riyadh to see Iraq as a sort of buffer or clearinghouse. In addition, the Kingdom would feel further “encircled”, given that through Najaf Iran would have the possibility both to strengthen its grip on the entire Iraqi Shiite camp and to strengthen the recruitment and indoctrination of Iraqi militiamen to be included in the aforementioned Mobilization Forces Popular (FMP) is, finally, to increase its influence on Saudi Shiite components and in neighboring countries, starting with Syria.
Therefore, if Riyadh fails to influence the choice of the successor of the old and sick Sistani, it would perhaps see the last reason in support of the attitude of partial openness held in the last two years towards Baghdad fall, with the historic resumption of bilateral relations after a quarter of a century, the announcement of new consulates in Najaf and Basra and the reopening of the border to freight traffic. On the other hand, this opening has already been deeply questioned by the involvement of FMPs in the missile attack against the Aramco production sites (September 2019) and by the continuous escalation between pro-Iranian militias and the United States following the killing in Baghdad of Suleimani and al-Muhandis.
Looking at the regional picture, the evolution of the Saudi posture towards Iran will likely be influenced by three main factors: an assessment of Tehran’s posture and objectives in the short to medium term; the evolution of the internal framework, and therefore the parable of Mohamed bin Salman’s leadership; an external framework of alliances whose volatility can also significantly influence the policies of the Kingdom.
As regards the first factor, from the Saudi point of view the last three years have outlined a rather clear dynamic. As international pressure builds on Iran and its regional network of interests, in which America’s “maximum pressure” strategy and Washington’s withdrawal from the JCPOA have played a prominent role, Tehran’s response has been to move the conflict from the most peripheral theaters to the Persian Gulf and to the Kingdom itself. Iran has therefore clearly signaled that it is willing to take a step, that of the direct attack on Saudi soil, which has taken Riyadh completely off guard. This is both in terms of prevention and contrast capacity (the Saudi anti-aircraft guns did not even activate during the attack last September on what is the real economic heart of the Kingdom) and in terms of response capacity. The extraordinary caution with which the Saudi leadership took care not to immediately point to Iran as the perpetrator of the attack signals that Riyadh absolutely wants to avoid any kind of direct confrontation with Tehran. With this in mind, in the near future the Kingdom could try to shift the rivalry with its neighbor to other regional theaters and keep it confined to arenas where an escalation cannot cause direct damage to either the national economy or the legitimacy of the ruling house. The extraordinary caution with which the Saudi leadership took care not to immediately point to Iran as the perpetrator of the attack signals that Riyadh absolutely wants to avoid any kind of direct confrontation with Tehran. With this in mind, in the near future the Kingdom could try to shift the rivalry with its neighbor to other regional theaters and keep it confined to arenas where an escalation cannot cause direct damage to either the national economy or the legitimacy of the ruling house. The extraordinary caution with which the Saudi leadership took care not to immediately point to Iran as the perpetrator of the attack signals that Riyadh absolutely wants to avoid any kind of direct confrontation with Tehran. With this in mind, in the near future the Kingdom could try to shift the rivalry with its neighbor to other regional theaters and keep it confined to arenas where an escalation cannot cause direct damage to either the national economy or the legitimacy of the ruling house.
This last point could take on more relevance as the succession to King Salman approaches and the intensification of competition within the Kingdom between the different branches of the Saud family. The country, in fact, has been going through a particularly delicate internal situation since 2015, essentially dictated by the ambition of Mohamed bin Salman. His sudden rise to power, which led him to be appointed heir to the throne at the age of 31 in 2017, took place in a totally irrational way with respect to the customs of the Kingdom. The passage of power that for the first time would take place vertically (ie from the sons to the grandchildren of al-Saud) and the surgical ouster of all his main rivals, presented as a campaign against corruption, intersect on the figure of bin Salman.
The fact that again in March 2020, 3 years after the first work of marginalizing his rivals, bin Salman had to resort to the arrest of some of them (Prince Muqrin and former Minister of the Interior Mohamed bin Nayef), testifies to how much he lacks the necessary consensus between the reigning family and what is considered possible that, in the event of the sudden death of the king, some branches of the family will try to prevent the ascension to the throne of his scion. To all this must be added the uncertainty surrounding the economic and social reforms promoted by bin Salman, which depend on the success of diversification from hydrocarbons and the evolution of the relationship with the Wahhabi clergy and the more conservative strata of society. In a framework already so full of unknowns, therefore,
Finally, a third factor that can influence the Saudi posture towards Iran is the evolution of the axis between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi and its declination in the different local contexts. Indeed, since 2015 some of the main Saudi moves in the region have been the result of joint initiatives with the Emirates. Although supported by excellent personal relationships, these initiatives nevertheless respond to agendas and strategic objectives that do not always coincide, even with regard to the common Iranian rival. Possible divergences can therefore add new variables to the rivalry between Tehran (or its referents in the region) and Riyadh, forcing the latter to move in a context in which it is less easy for it to dictate the agenda and priorities in total autonomy. An example of this is the recent evolution of the conflict in Yemen, where, as previously reconstructed, a Saudi and Emirati coalition has been fighting since 2015 against the Houthi rebels, which in the meantime have become an Iranian proxy. In the summer of 2019, after months of warnings, this coalition has shown evident signs of abating, even reaching direct clashes between the different Yemeni factions and militias supported by the two powers. This has affected the sustainability of the military campaign, but also the launch of a phase of revision of the priorities and objectives of the coalition in the conflict, in which the Emirati instances have had a greater weight than in the past. Against this background must therefore be placed the greater willingness of Riyadh to reopen the dialogue with the Houthis, which has materialized in particular starting from the first months of 2020. a Saudi and Emirati coalition has been fighting since 2015 against the Houthi rebels, which in the meantime have become an Iranian proxy. In the summer of 2019, after months of warnings, this coalition has shown evident signs of abating, even reaching direct clashes between the different Yemeni factions and militias supported by the two powers. This has affected the sustainability of the military campaign, but also the launch of a phase of revision of the priorities and objectives of the coalition in the conflict, in which the Emirati instances have had a greater weight than in the past. Against this background must therefore be placed the greater willingness of Riyadh to reopen the dialogue with the Houthis, which has materialized in particular starting from the first months of 2020. a Saudi and Emirati coalition has been fighting since 2015 against the Houthi rebels, which in the meantime have become an Iranian proxy. In the summer of 2019, after months of warnings, this coalition has shown evident signs of abating, even reaching direct clashes between the different Yemeni factions and militias supported by the two powers. This has affected the sustainability of the military campaign, but also the launch of a phase of revision of the priorities and objectives of the coalition in the conflict, in which the Emirati instances have had a greater weight than in the past. Against this background must therefore be placed the greater willingness of Riyadh to reopen the dialogue with the Houthis, which has materialized in particular starting from the first months of 2020. after months of rumblings, this coalition has shown evident signs of abating, even going so far as to direct clashes between the different Yemeni factions and militias supported by the two powers. This has affected the sustainability of the military campaign, but also the launch of a phase of revision of the priorities and objectives of the coalition in the conflict, in which the Emirati instances have had a greater weight than in the past. Against this background must therefore be placed the greater willingness of Riyadh to reopen the dialogue with the Houthis, which has materialized in particular starting from the first months of 2020. after months of rumblings, this coalition has shown evident signs of abating, even going so far as to direct clashes between the different Yemeni factions and militias supported by the two powers. This has affected the sustainability of the military campaign, but also the launch of a phase of revision of the priorities and objectives of the coalition in the conflict, in which the Emirati instances have had a greater weight than in the past. Against this background must therefore be placed the greater willingness of Riyadh to reopen the dialogue with the Houthis, which has materialized in particular starting from the first months of 2020. but also on the launch of a phase of revision of the priorities and objectives of the coalition in the conflict, in which the Emirati instances have had a greater weight than in the past. Against this background must therefore be placed the greater willingness of Riyadh to reopen the dialogue with the Houthis, which has materialized in particular starting from the first months of 2020. but also on the launch of a phase of revision of the priorities and objectives of the coalition in the conflict, in which the Emirati instances have had a greater weight than in the past. Against this background must therefore be placed the greater willingness of Riyadh to reopen the dialogue with the Houthis, which has materialized in particular starting from the first months of 2020.
In taking stock, based on what has been said so far, it is clear that the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia will continue to have a profound impact on the dynamics and balances of the entire region. In fact, all the traditional assumptions of this rivalry are still present, if not even exacerbated by certain developments, for example the killing of Suleimani and the consequent cycle of reprisals that is involving Iraq and increasing the exposure of Tehran. At the same time, even in the midst of a season of high-level tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, it should be noted that there has never been a total closure of the channels of dialogue. The traditional “mediator” countries in the dynamics of the Gulf, namely Oman and Kuwait, have continued to use their diplomacy to avoid further escalation.
Therefore, trying to outline the possible evolutionary lines of this rivalry, a first trend to consider is its extreme volatility. If the desire to avoid a direct, open and protracted clash emerges from both sides of the Gulf, the belief that this clash is not really desired or considered sustainable by any power, regional or otherwise, also falls into the calculation of Riyadh and Tehran. In evaluating the effects of their external actions, therefore, the two countries take into account a sort of “safety net”, such that, when tensions reach truly unsustainable levels, diplomacy, and not force, would be the still have the upper hand.
In the near future, the evolution of the regional situation could lead to a further increase in this volatility. In fact, a second trend in the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is to exploit in an almost systematic way all the windows of opportunity that are created in the region to expand its influence. Therefore, as early as the next few months, such windows are likely to multiply. Several concomitant factors are in fact creating the conditions for a strong destabilization of the entire Middle Eastern region. First of all, the new crisis in the relationship between state and society, which has now emerged in a full-blown way with the 2018-2019 protest waves that swept through Lebanon and Iraq. Compared to the previous ones in 2011 and other street riots that took place in the last two years in other countries of the region, the new feature of these protests was the open acknowledgment by the demonstrators of the harmfulness of sectarianism. Indeed, the sectarian element has been indicated by many of the souls of the protests as the real target of their criticism. The Lebanese and Iraqi protesters, that is, have questioned the very ethnic-religious element that both Iran and Saudi Arabia have used so far as the main track of their rivalry. Therefore, it cannot be excluded that, faced with the prospect of losing the control traditionally exercised over certain segments of society and politics, Riyadh and Tehran opt for more muscular and assertive reactions. Secondly,
In such a context, the Iranian model of influence built over the past four decades undoubtedly has competitive advantages over the vectors of Saudi external action. This derives from having asymmetrical actors (on paper, those best positioned to exploit the failures of the state apparatus) as referents in local theaters. However, this advantage is tempered by the fact that many of Tehran’s proxies are now deeply rooted in institutions and in the economic fabric and could therefore in turn become targets of protests. In addition, the status of Iranian proxies today is far more ambiguous than in the past, as the justification of “resistance against Israel” that helped to sweeten Tehran’s interference in the internal affairs of other countries fades. However, Riyadh does not seem to have so far developed the right tools to profit from the shift of Iranian referents from the revolutionary to the reactionary and deeply conservative pole. The Saudi Kingdom in recent years has indeed taken care to support the protectors of the status quo and is therefore equally in difficulty.
Ultimately, therefore, the conditions exist for an expansion of the regional network of Iranian contacts even in unprecedented contexts. However, the ties of this network could be less solid and lasting than those matured in past decades, giving way to a more functional and less ideological relationship between the Islamic Republic and the local referent. In any case, such an eventuality, in all likelihood, would only exacerbate the rivalry between Tehran and Riyadh and increase polarization in the region. On the other hand, the low cost of replicating such a well-established model makes it particularly suitable as a projection tool in a context of greater economic and political instability.
In addition, the rooting of “historical” Iranian proxies in local contexts, as well as the process of “Hezbollization”, which has reached different stages for Tehran’s referents in Iraq and Syria, raise the political cost of an action against them. actors. It is no coincidence that Iraqi Shiite militias, with the start of the protest season in autumn 2019, seek greater legitimacy by putting nationalism and anti-Americanism credentials to the fore. In parallel, in the Syrian case, the Iranian representatives make up for the lack of a significant Shiite community in the country by presenting themselves as essential elements of the newly established security apparatuses. The Saudis are obliged to take into account these dynamics. Indeed, the contrast to them tends to approach a destabilization of the entire country in which they operate, precisely by virtue of their increasingly central role in social, economic and political equilibrium. All factors that tend to strengthen the structural reasons behind the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In this sense, it appears absolutely probable that also in the near future the two powers will continue to move according to a zero-sum logic, contributing to increasing the overall instability of the region.
