In-depth analysis by Giuseppe Gagliano
On several occasions we have taken into careful consideration the operations that Russia has conducted to eliminate its dissidents, operations that have been stigmatized by Europe as inadmissible operations, unacceptable because they are characteristics of an authoritarian system.
However, a closer look at the clandestine operations of the security services – and in particular the French ones – shows how these operations have been and are usual (think of those of the Mossad against Black September or Hamas).
This is what emerges from the essay written by the French journalist – collaborator of the periodical Le Figaro – Vincent Nouzille entitled Le tueurs de la republique published in 2105. In the third chapter entitled Basses oeuvres en francafrique Nouzille, he underlines how the action team of the services French security was in charge of eliminating the Cameroonian leader of the Union of Peoples of Cameroon (UPC). On October 15, 1960, Felix Moumie was invited to dinner in a Geneva restaurant, Le Plat d’Argent, by a Cameroonian student, a beautiful young woman and a 60-year-old who posed as a “journalist”. Of course, the Cameroonian political leader in exile could not have imagined that the glass of wine placed in front of him contained a formidable poison: thallium. At the end of the meal, he will end up swallowing his two glasses at the same time. Then each of the operatives will go their own way. A few hours later, Felix Moumie will be found dying in his hotel room. Taken to hospital, he will die after two weeks on November 3.
The elimination of the enemy of France was an example of Operation Homo and was the work of the French secret services, the Sdece (Service de Documentation Exterieure et de Contre-Espionnage), then led by General Paul Grossin. It is a real Homo operation, validated by the highest authorities and conducted by an SA reservist, such as those that were conducted in the context of the Algerian war. Contrary to legend, the Sdece is not content with hitting pro-Algerian targets. France will feed, in the heart of her former colonies which have just acquired their independence, those who are suspected of wanting to counter her influence. General Paul Aussaresses, formerly of Sdece, will openly acknowledge that it is the services that have ordered the liquidation of Felix Moumie. It was, he said he, “To eliminate an African extremist in exile who was acting against the legal government of his country”. In charge of SDECE activities in Africa, Maurice Robert admits that he supported a “radical solution” against the leader of the UPC: “The UPC was the center of a permanent revolt. He called for a revolution and risked giving fire and blood to Cameroon, in a context of ethnic conflict. We had to deliver a great blow, behead her. ” These confessions reveal the Gaullist power’s support for President Ahmadou Ahidjo’s bloody repression in Cameroon, which was given at the explicit request of Cameroon. Maurice Robert admits that he supported a “radical solution” against the leader of the UPC: “The UPC was the center of a permanent revolt. He called for a revolution and risked giving fire and blood to Cameroon, in a context of ethnic conflict. We had to deliver a great blow, behead her. ” These confessions reveal the Gaullist power’s support for President Ahmadou Ahidjo’s bloody repression in Cameroon, which was given at the explicit request of Cameroon. Maurice Robert admits that he supported a “radical solution” against the leader of the UPC: “The UPC was the center of a permanent revolt. He called for a revolution and risked giving fire and blood to Cameroon, in a context of ethnic conflict. We had to deliver a great blow, behead her. ” These confessions reveal the Gaullist power’s support for President Ahmadou Ahidjo’s bloody repression in Cameroon, which was given at the explicit request of Cameroon.
Well, the Homo operations are one of the best kept secrets of the Republic: in its name and by order of the highest political authorities, France has engaged in targeted killings and other very particular operations aimed at eliminating some of its enemies. Since the birth of the Fifth Republic in 1958, all presidents, each in their own way, have resorted to this type of action, although some have refused to do so. The granting of this license to kill is part of their prerogative. These orders are in fact based on an almost absolute secrecy, shared by a select committee of officials: generally, the director of the DGSE, the chief of staff of the president and the chief of staff of the armed forces when the soldiers are engaged.
France has assassins who can be mobilized at any time for these missions. Specialized teams from DGSE’s Action Service (SA) train there continuously. An ultra-secret cell called Alpha was even activated in the mid-1980s to conduct Homo operations in complete secrecy.
And this device remains operational, along with other human resources employed by the SA. Within armies, special forces have gained more and more influence in recent years, gradually invading the borders of the SA. Under the leadership of the Special Operations Command (COS), elite commandos have become accustomed to “surgical” interventions on the fringes of open conflict, often with the support of conventional military means, such as fighters. They are referred to in the vaguest terms: they are referred to as “cleanup operations” or “neutralization” of “high value targets” – High Value Targets (HVTs) in US military jargon. A civilized semantics that masks bloody actions.
When France does not want to get its hands dirty or does not have the means to intervene directly, it has recourse to third parties, be they American hunters and drones, mercenaries, local auxiliaries and foreign services. The total of these “eliminations” carried out in recent years reveals an intensive use of this “license to kill”: according to a – minimalist – count based on open source, the number of HVTs neutralized by the armed forces, or by them, has reached one hundred since 2013.
Faced with threats believed to be growing, Francois Hollande, and now Emmanuel Macron, did not skimp on the use of force. A state of law has the right to defend itself, even clandestinely. These words are consistent with those of Alexandre de Marenches, director of Sdece (ancestor of DGSE) from 1970 to 1981 who justified, in a famous book, the use of murders in the name of the reason of state: “When you have a dealing with illegals, terrorists and snipers who are often called terrorists and vice versa, there are no rules. Everything is fine, ”he said. Among the most striking episodes that the French journalist remembers are the attempted murders of Ben Bella and Nasser. The liquidation of Ben Bella and the main leaders of the FLN was requested by the government of Edgar Faure in May 1955 and entrusted to Sdece, which started a vast operation called Hors-Jeu. However, several plans to assassinate Ben Bella had already failed: at the end of 1955, for example, an armed killer entered the room of the Hotel Mehari in Cairo where Ben Bella slept, but I miss his target. The failed operation of July 1956 shows that the authorities are reluctant to carry it out. Ben Bella will eventually be kidnapped by the French, along with four other FLN leaders, on 22 October, following the hijacking of a plane connecting Rabat to Tunis, orchestrated by Sdece. The failed operation of July 1956 shows that the authorities are reluctant to carry it out. Ben Bella will eventually be kidnapped by the French, along with four other FLN leaders, on 22 October, following the hijacking of a plane connecting Rabat to Tunis, orchestrated by Sdece. The failed operation of July 1956 shows that the authorities are reluctant to carry it out. Ben Bella will eventually be kidnapped by the French, along with four other FLN leaders, on 22 October, following the hijacking of a plane connecting Rabat to Tunis, orchestrated by Sdece.
In December 1956, in Port Said, Egypt, a remote-controlled explosion upon arrival of the target was canceled on superior order. The Sdece document reveals that the target in question was none other than General Nasser. The Egyptian president was in fact considered an enemy by France, because he supported and armed the Algerian rebellion of the FLN. In collaboration with the Israeli secret services, Mossad and Aman (military intelligence), one evening in December 1956, an SA commando flanked by a Mossad team buried three hundred kilograms of TNT under the main square of Port Said. The operation was stopped at the last moment by the French and Israeli governments, who feared the consequences.
What lessons do we learn from this illuminating historical example
Certainly different. In the first place, we must never forget that the history of a country at peace and above all at war must also be understood starting from the actions that the security services have carried out, a history that has no marginal or anecdotal value; secondly, democratic states in certain scenarios act in a similar way to authoritarian systems, that is, in derogation from the principles of morality and law.
Precisely for this reason sociological and philosophical ruminations are too often self-referential, that is, very far from being able to explain the complexity and contradiction of democratic institutions. In fact, to believe that the arcane empires and the logic of reason of state have miraculously disappeared with the birth of the sacred principles of democracy is only an illusion. This is an illusion, however, which can prove to be dangerous because it can considerably undermine the understanding of the actual dynamics of history and of the political choices made by governments.
