To consolidate the truce, the new Israeli government must focus on economic benefits for the Israeli Arabs and for the Palestinians of the West Bank. General Carlo Jean’s analysis
Apart from the controversy over the responsibility for the initiation of the violence, the attention on the recent conflict between Israelis and Palestinians has been directed above all to the rocket launches by Hamas and the Israeli bombings in the Gaza Strip. Less attention was paid to the revolt in Israel of its Arab citizens and to the fact that the Palestinians of the West Bank participated only marginally, despite calls from Hamas for a new “Intifada”. Indeed, the al-Fatah police collaborated with the Israeli police to contain the violence.
These are facts that demonstrate the complexity of the interconnections existing between both Israeli and Palestinian internal political dynamics. There has been a lot of interference from external actors – regional and global – who have aimed to extend their influence in the region, taking advantage of the opportunities offered to them by the Palestinian question. It is a “zero-sum game”, therefore unsolvable with negotiations. Nor can it be resolved by resorting to military force or by economic concessions or sanctions. It cannot be that even with the current leaderships. Netanyahu’s Israeli right is far more radical than Begin’s or Sharon’s. It cannot propose the destruction of Hamas – possible only with the reoccupation of Gaza – since it would involve unacceptable losses and a long control of the territory.
In the Palestinian camp, Al-Fatah is completely discredited. Hamas does not intend to give up its constituent principle of the destruction of Israel, but it never has or has the military capabilities to do so.
Israel is now a superpower in the Middle East. He has a GDP per capita that is 14 times higher than that of Egypt; 8 times that of Iran; double that of Saudi Arabia. It has reserves of $ 180 billion. It spends 5% of its GDP on research. It has a military strength superior to that of any other country, or possible coalition, in the region. His power in new technologies makes great powers seek his friendship. With the “Abrahamic Agreements” today it has normal relations with various Arab countries, which have abandoned the Palestinian cause. His greatest vulnerability lies in his relations with the United States, which have failed with Joe Biden, and in the fact that he will no longer be able to have as complete support as Trump’s.
Before the outbreak of the last conflict, the dominant term for living with the Palestinian question and addressing the many problems of the Middle East was “de-escalation”. The dialogue for the restoration of the nuclear treaty was resumed between the USA and Iran; Saudi Arabia and the Emirates had started a dialogue with Tehran, to define a status quo in the Gulf; Turkey and Egypt had resumed negotiations concerning mainly Libya and the Levantine Basin; with the Abrahamic Agreements various Sunni Arab states had recognized Israel; the Israeli nationalist parties had opened negotiations with the Arab-Israeli parties for the constitution of a coalition government; the US, with Biden abandoning President Trump’s radical pro-Israel positions, they had re-legitimized their traditional role as mediator between Israel and the Palestinians. The outbreak of the new conflict has put the entire de-escalation process back into play. Despite the mediation of Egypt and Qatar, it is difficult to predict if and how a peace process can be restarted, transforming the current truce into something solid.
As mentioned, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has peculiar characteristics that prevent the victory of one side and, therefore, the conclusion of a peace. Neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians have realistic goals. The solution of the “two states”, identified in Oslo in 1993, and definitively disappeared, if not in the fantasies of some idealists or in the diplomatic language of those who do not know “which fish to take” and take refuge in “politically correct”. The alternative of a single federal state, with ample autonomy of the various components, remains smoky. It is very difficult for the Palestinians to be satisfied with only administrative autonomy. It is impossible for the Israelis to renounce the ethno-religious principle of Palestine as the nation-state of the Jews.
After the threats unleashed by their withdrawal from Gaza, it is very difficult for them to withdraw from the West Bank. What is happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrates the difficulties of imposing a federal structure from above and from without. The only viable approach to consolidating the truce seems to me to be the acceptance by the new Israeli government to put aside religious disputes and institutional arrangements, aiming at economic benefits for the Israeli Arabs and for the Palestinians of the West Bank. And what the Arab-Israeli Ra’am Party essentially requires for its external support: new hospitals, equal rights for workers, greater funds for municipalities and strengthening of local police.
