There is always a card to draw in the deck, the problem is figuring out which one is the best. For Monte dei Paschi, after the not painless breakdown of negotiations between Unicredit and the shareholder Tesoro, various roads open up, some uphill and full of curves, others decidedly more viable. Yesterday from the mouth of the CEO of the Mef, Alessandro Rivera , the first precise indications on the future of Siena arrived: half-market recapitalization (3 billion, at least), clean-up of the balance sheets and remittance of the bank on the market, subject to the granting of a substantial extension by the ‘Europe.
Then, it will be necessary to find the famous industrial solution. And here the knots could come to a head. The State, as made clear by Rivera himself, cannot remain a shareholder of Monte. Then another entity could come forward, perhaps Banco Bpm, whose shoulders are not as broad as those of Unicredit. Again, a large foreign bank, probably French, could be involved, such as Bnp Paribas or Agricole. However, it is difficult to think of a government approval, especially with Lega and Fratelli d’Italia part of the team. Dead end
No. Ignazio Angeloni , economist at Harvard Kennedy School, former member of the Supervisory Board of the ECB and a great connoisseur of Mario Draghi, in recent days has launched its proposal: a pool of Italian banks to take over the share of the Treasury. Interviewed by, he goes further and explains the genesis and rationale of a solution with a completely systemic flavor. After the break between the Treasury and Unicredit, the future of Mps appears very uncertain. You have proposed the involvement of some Italian banks that can take over the controlling share of the Mef. Why it should work
Mind you, even I don’t consider that proposal as the ideal in an absolute sense, that is, if we could rewrite history starting several years ago. Rather, I see it as the last call for Mps, to the point where we have arrived, to avoid the prospect or a worse solution, such as the stand alone strategy or the involvement of a decidedly less robust bank, or the dissolution of the bank with or without the involvement of the EU resolution authority. The last hypothesis is frightening and not a little. The end of the oldest bank in the world …
The latter hypothesis is the one that the European manual would provide for a bank that is unable to find sufficient capital on the market. However, it does not seem to me that the Italian System, understood as a policy but also including a part of the financial sector, is ready to take this last path. Rather, I see the risk of that outcome that Americans call kicking the can further down the road, that is, procrastinating again. After what happened in 2017, procrastination is still forbidden. Okay, but then, how does it come out
So I say: with a collective operation, which would not cost too much to any of the banks involved and which would cost the taxpayer less than what the deal with Unicredit would have cost, we can close the matter and also show the European partners that Italy is more cohesive. and decided than you think. This I think is in everyone’s long-term interest. The condition, of course, is that all major banks participate. Nobody, for example, should be called out because they just did a merger, or because they’re planning one. And that the operation is truly definitive.
This means that the new MPS (a nice oxymoron, for the oldest bank in the world) should have excellent balance sheet numbers, be much smaller and specialized in products and services that are important for the reference area, and with a completely clean asset. . This involves an independent and rigorous Asset Quality Review. All things that were not done in 2017. Someone brought up two large French banks. But the government is unlikely to give the green light. She who says
I am absolutely in favor of further integration of the banking sector in Europe. On the contrary, I think that European legislation should be changed to favor this development. In the specific case, however, it seems to me that this perspective is less preferable than an Italian intervention. French banks are already significantly present in Italy. It would also be good if the solution did not risk being seen as a sign of weakness in our system, which must be resorted to abroad after various unsuccessful attempts. Let’s go back to your proposal. When one thinks of the rescue of several banks towards a single institution (the Carige case teaches), the thought immediately turns to the Interbank Fund. How does your proposal differ from a scheme already seen in the past, such as that of the Fitd
It only preceded me by a moment, I would have touched on this point right now. Not bad, then. Please.
My idea would not involve the Fitd in any way. For two reasons. The first is that the Fund should be concerned with the protection of small depositors, not with financing and managing bank bailouts. The point of reference for such an institution must be the one operating in the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or Fdic, as Governor Visco also argued. The Fdic does not recapitalize banks, it liquidates them when they fail by repaying deposits below a certain threshold. The other reason is precisely the fact that past examples have not proven themselves well. I have the feeling that it refers to the case of Banca Carige …
The case you remember is one of them. It is a bank that after many years is still in a precarious condition. I do not think it is essentially the Fund’s fault, rather it is a task for which they do not have adequate resources and tools. Instead, I hypothesized a joint venture, in which the banks by mutual agreement would entrust a team of managers with the task of presenting a project in a short time that satisfies certain sustainability requirements. The collective nature of the operation would guarantee that the solution does not reflect the particular interest of anyone, I suspect that someone had advanced in the case of Unicredit. And that it doesn’t weigh heavily on anyone. And the Treasury, what role it should play in the game
I think it is advisable and that the Treasury does not participate in the negotiation, if anything setting only some general conditions at the start. Angeloni, according to many observers and also according to Minister Franco himself, Unicredit would have evaded the confrontation because the Treasury was not willing to support a very substantial capital increase. According to her, there was really no more room for maneuver.
I have no information on how the negotiation took place, beyond what you could read in the newspapers. I am therefore unable to answer this question.The first effect of the pandemic will be to increase the problem rate at Italian banks. Those who lose their jobs or downsize their business are unlikely to be able to repay a loan. We must expect more banking crises with a systemic flavor
The conditions of the banking system are one of the great unknowns of the post-pandemic phase, to which we do not yet know the answer. The effect will be there, there is no doubt, although I personally hope and believe that it will be lower than what the ECB, with due caution, had estimated in the central months of the Covid crisis. The high growth rates that the Italian economy is registering at the moment bodes well. In the event that, once the cover of anti-pandemic measures has been lifted, it is discovered that the crisis leaves unsustainable aftermaths in certain banks, it will still be possible to intervene with support, but in a more selective way. In short, there is to be quite calm.
What I rather fear is another thing: that is, that the persistent unsolved problems of our banking system return after the pandemic, which, we must acknowledge today with some disappointment, not even the banking union was able to fully resolve in the previous years. -Covid. Also for this reason, putting the Mps node behind us would be an important step forward.

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