As the weeks passed, it became clear that the war in Ukraine would not end with a quick Russian victory, the future evolution of the conflict appeared with high probability that it must be that of a hard and prolonged confrontation on the ground. And he confirms the progressive exhaustion of the Russian offensive thrust, which has been matched by the Ukrainian counter-offensives of recent days in the logic of “overturning” typical of every war conflict.
This state of affairs has led some observers to believe that the war could end with a Korean-style solution. The country could be divided along a ceasefire line which, although highly militarized and despite the absence of a peace agreement, would be destined to consolidate over time. Between what happened during and after the Korean War (June 1950 – July 1953) and what happens today in Ukraine there are obviously very strong differences of different orders: historical, political, military, cultural.
That said, thinking about both cases, the conclusion of the first and the perspectives of the second, can nevertheless help to understand some aspects of the war in progress.
On 25 June 1950 a small peripheral country of the communist political sphere, North Korea, attacked the neighbor from which it was separated from the end of the Second World War along the 38th parallel. The initial unexpected and overwhelming advance, which led to the conquest almost entirely of the Korean peninsula, was followed by the intervention of the United States with other allies, legitimized by a resolution of the Security Council adopted in the absence of the Soviet delegate. The intervention temporarily reversed the fate of the confrontation and the allies conquered much of North Korean territory. The Chinese “volunteers” came into play, flocking en masse across the border with the People’s Republic, who drove Americans and allies back towards the 38th parallel. The war came to a standstill and on the line defined by the ceasefire agreement, the new border between the two Koreas was consolidated, without ever following a peace treaty. The differences with the war in Ukraine are numerous and strong. Today it is a great nuclear power that attacks its weakest neighbor, an external intervention under the UN flag is impossible, if only because of the Russian veto, and any other direct intervention in favor of Ukraine would risk unleashing a general nuclear war.
Since 2014, however, with the detachment of part of the Donbass from Kiev, there were already two Ukrainians. In light of the guidelines followed by the Russian offensive, it is more than realistic to think that Vladimir Putin ‘s plans had the objective of ensuring the Federation direct and / or indirect control of part of the Ukrainian territory. How much is
impossible to say today. In any armed conflict, however, the very configuration of the territory that is the subject of the conflict to a large extent dictates the unfolding of the war interaction and its outcomes.
There are always geographically evident, clearly significant points that “orient” the action of the parties, both in military operations and at the time of ceasefire and peace negotiations. In Korea it was the 38th parallel that took on a strong meaning and symbolic value, although the demarcation line established at the end of the hostilities does not follow it precisely at all. The parties spontaneously oriented themselves towards that “meeting point”.
Looking at the map of Ukraine you can see points that have a similar meaning, a similar prominence. Before February 24, Crimea was a Russian island in Ukrainian territory. That this situation “pushed” towards the creation by the Russian side of a territorial contiguity between Crimea and Donbass, through the conquest of the coastal region of the Sea of ​​Azov, was evident.
It remains doubtful, however, that Putin intended to extend this territorial contiguity up to Transnistria. The configuration of Ukraine, its history and culture, however, highlight another and much more important line that cuts the country in two. It is the great river Dnieper, to the east of which the Russian empire extended and a large part of the cultural heritage and the Russian or Russian-speaking ethnic component of the country is concentrated. It is therefore not unrealistic to think, even in the light of the guidelines followed by the Russian offensive, that this entire area was the Kremlin’s most optimistic target.
The Dnieper could have represented a clear, clear dividing line, a new and unambiguous border between two Ukrainians, thus prefiguring the creation in the absence of a peace agreement of a new Korea in the heart of Europe. At present, however, the Russian forces are having great difficulty in establishing both full control of just the two Donbass oblasts and the entire coastal strip on the Azov Sea. The future consolidation of a stable ceasefire line, in a “Korean” perspective, would require the presence of two conditions: that the losses and costs of both parties were such as to induce them to settle for the territory under their control; that this line was well defined in a geographical, unambiguous sense. None of these conditions exist at the moment and appear to be likely to arise in the short term.
The continuous supply of Ukrainian perhaps from abroad, the possible Chinese support for Putin, the very configuration of Ukraine, with its immense plains, are all conditions that make a Korean-type solution not credible. The presence of a different analogy can be significant between the two cases.
General Douglas MacArthur was exonerated from command of the forces in Korea because he complained of not being able to act – perhaps even with the use of nuclear weapons – against the sources in Chinese territory, “sanctified”, which fed relentlessly the war effort of his enemies. Today the Russians are faced with a very similar problem.