The referendum on reducing the number of parliamentarians in Italy is approaching with great strides. It seemed obvious a victory of the Yes until a few months ago. To be nasty, the tip from INPS about the famous “crafty” (the parliamentarians who asked for the contribution of 600 euros), taken up with great headlines, and for several days, by many newspapers, would perhaps seem to indicate that such a victory would not and 100% more certain. Maybe.
In this sense, it is worth spending a few words on the reasons for yes and no. In my opinion there are three types of reasons common to both fronts: factual, ideological and strategic. The first two are roughly equivalent. The factual reasons in substance. The ideological ones in their paucity. As we shall see, the strategic ones remain. And it is on these that the center-right should give us (more than) a little thought.
Let’s start with the factual ones. Those who support the Yes substantially put forward three sets of reasons: first, in Italy we have more parliamentarians than the other European democracies. The referendum would therefore bring us in line with other countries, potentially making the role of parliamentarians more visible, which would therefore (finally
) called to greater responsiveness towards the voters, thereby improving the quality of Italian democracy. Second: reducing the number of parliamentarians would lead to a (small, but always greater than zero) saving in public spending. Third: since the attempts at organic constitutional reform have all failed in the past years, it is better to start a process of punctual constitutional reforms. Let’s start with the reduction in the number of parliamentarians, and then leave it to Parliament to change the institutional arrangements consistent with this reduction (starting with perfect bicameralism, etc.). And it is precisely this last aspect that brings wood to the No. especially on the necessary institutional reforms that should accompany a yes victory in the referendum. With the risk not of generating an incomplete reform, as some say, but useless, if not harmful, for the quality of the functioning of a Parliament called to act exactly as before, but with half of its members. Ergo, why sign a blank check whose departure is known but not the arrival
Because the real risk is that the victory of the SI will only serve to accelerate the implementation of a purely proportional electoral reform. A reform that would go exactly against the wishes of those who support the Yes: given that it would not only reduce the incentives for the responsiveness of the deputies (other than increase it), but also would inevitably postpone the moment of the formation of the government to the parliamentary seat, thus eliminating a of the few politically valid things of the Second Republic: the possibility for citizens, at the moment of the vote, to choose not only a party, but also, in the making, a governing coalition.
The ideological reasons behind the two sides are well known: the vote for Yes, and a vote against the caste. The vote for No is a vote to safeguard the most beautiful constitution in the world against the populist threat. Both reasons are absolute, therefore unassailable, and therefore indefensible
And finally we come to the strategic reasons (politically speaking). The SI victory would inevitably be endorsed by the M5S, regardless of who voted Yes with him about it in Parliament. And it would be, useless to hide it. Even the leaders of the Democratic Party know this very well. So much so that they are ready to pay the price, because it is the only way to strengthen the agreement with the 5 Stars also at the local level, as well as to cement the government alliance in view of the election of the President of the Republic next future. (and the huge European funds coming in which need someone to manage them…). On the other hand, a beautiful proportional reform following the victory of the SI would also be the only way, given the current polls, to increase the probability of a center-right non-victory. It’s not a casuality,
) in favor of the Yes.
It is instead a mystery why the center-right officially continues to be so. Of course, making a U-turn today could be expensive (but the Democratic Party did not do it in the opposite direction
). Of course, the chances of Si winning are clearly – at the moment – greater than the alternative, and it would be politically expensive to be on the losing side (especially if Si were to win with Bulgarian majorities – ask Craxiand his “go to the sea” for knowledge). But … 1) the constitutional referendum does not need a quorum. And this is an important point: to go to vote (especially in regions where there is no administrative vote) will therefore be those most interested in the issue. Those most mobilized by a strong political narrative following a center-right that finally took a clear position in this regard for the No; 2) the victory of the No (or even a narrow defeat) would be an important (feral
) blow for the current majority, especially if accompanied by a good result (of the center-right) in the regional.
Creation by Paragoneof his Italexit, and the first flattering polling estimates that accompany it, could in fact represent a light to attract several M5S moths (i.e. parliamentarians) worried about their future, thus abandoning the current majority (which in the Senate, let us remember, has numbers very narrow); 3) as already mentioned above, the victory of It would open the doors to the only electoral reform that would prevent a clear victory for the center-right. In short, taking a stand for the No would certainly be a risky option for the center-right. But it would be a risk to take. What else would he have to do if he really wants to avoid waiting for the 2023 elections to try to return to power with, last but not least, a Romano Prodito oversee the process of formation of the government as the new President of the Republic
.
