The prevailing fronts opened by the Russian advance are four, and they are outlining a political geography that has a precise symbolic, strategic and ethnic connotation, well emphasized also by the cartographic production of the Russian world, where the cultural and ethnic implications, too often forgotten by the In the West, they are promptly claimed with the semiotic apparatus of cartography (Crimea as colorful as Russia and now placed outside the Ukrainian borders, for example).
The map of the Russian advance
The first front is that of eastern Ukraine (which the Russian media not accidentally define as the “western part” of the front), which led the Kremlin to establish its military presence in the Donbass region and in the two republics of Lugansk and Donetsk.
This is what was the goal considered prevalent by the first military moves, to reclaim the areas occupied by about 38-39% by population of Russian culture. It was precisely the cultural, ethnic and linguistic component (the percentage of Russian speakers reaches up to 75% in Donetsk and 69% in Lugansk) one of the ideological bases of the war claims put forward by Putin in his speech announcing the imminent conflict.
From there, one of the nerve centers on which military force is being used the most and Mariupol, a city object of attacks in recent days and declared by the mayor himself now in Russian hands, of strategic importance because it is located only 60 km from the border with Russia and 115km south of the city of Donetsk.
And then because, overlooking the Sea of ​​Azov, it would make it possible to strategically control that quadrant, for the subsequent control of the coast overlooking the Black Sea, closing a large part of the coast from Odessa to the Crimea.
Right from here the opening of the second front is clearly visible. The peninsula which in March 2014 passed under the control of Moscow (and which, as such, is claimed in Russian papers), has a percentage of the population belonging to the Russian culture of about 58%. From there, Russian sources report that the armed forces have occupied Kherson and Nykolaiv. The latter is a city-bridge towards Odessa, a much more significant objective in symbolic and geographical terms, towards which the operations in Moscow are heading. Just two days ago there was an attack on an Estonian cargo and the information that arrives speaks of an advance by sea towards the city overlooking the Black Sea.
Odessa is not only the fourth largest city by population in Ukraine, but it is also the symbol of events of the past of great importance: from the repression of the workers’ revolt supported by the Potemkin Battleship in 1905 to the subsequent massacres of Jews and then to the October massacre of 1941, until the recent killing of 48 pro-Russian demonstrators at the House of Trade Unions on 2 May 2014. The same region of Odessa was hit yesterday by air strikes. From Crimea, another of the declared objectives is Voznesens’k, a city about 150km from Odessa of 35 thousand inhabitants.
In the map of the Russian presence another front, often not considered by the media, relating to the independent Moldavian region of Transnistria, clearly visible in Russian cartography and also in Lukashenko’s recent speech, which would have revealed its strategic importance in the strategic planning of the Kremlin: the strip of Russian land located outside the Russian borders could in fact be one of the final objectives of a single front with Odessa, which would lead the Russian Army to close a large part of the southern and eastern portion of Ukraine in favor of Moscow, holding faith in the logic of common cultural belonging to Russkiy Mir. Putin seems to be looking to Kiev to forcefully overlook the Black Sea.
Lukashenko’s map
Looking at the map of Russian occupations and including Transnistria in it, the potential split of Ukraine into two distinct parts appears clearly visible, closed by an ideal border that would reach Transnistria from the north of Kiev, as if to presage that an intermediate solution identified by Moscow could also be that of closing the Ukrainian front with this imaginary meridian, which in fact includes the priority strategic objectives and would lead to controlling a large part of the coast overlooking the Black Sea.
The primary objective of the Russian advance obviously remains Kiev which, if it capitulates, would guarantee Putin that regime change which at the moment is obviously Moscow’s first strategic objective, but the Kremlin’s strategy would also aim at full control of the Black Sea, which is little considered. (needless to reiterate how much the possession of the capital would be decisive for the military, political and social fortunes of the entire country), but a strategic objective of no second importance.
On the north-eastern front, the city of Kharkiv, the second most populous in the country, was severely hit by the Russian aviation air attacks, with extensive damage to military and civilians: the geographical position of the city would allow to control the vast eastern area of the country and to extend the dominion from the Donbass to the north. And also in this case there are relevant factors from the symbolic point of view and the importance that the city has, being the second most important in the country and being the former capital.
The map of military operations therefore serves not only to understand the intentions of the actors in the field and the degree of resistance of the Ukrainians, but also the strategic direction taken: because the map is always an instrument of partial power, of symbolic and factual control, as well as of military planning. To understand the conflict – and not just to plan it, as Lukashenko did – it is always advisable to observe one.
Alessandro Ricci
