Beijing’s denial of the alleged hypersonic test in space came from Zhao Lijian , spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry. In the previous hours, the news in the Financial Times about the August launch of a nuclear-capable carrier capable of overcoming the atmosphere and returning at great speed had gone around the world, also due to the “surprise” (according to the British newspaper). generated in American intelligence. But, Lijian said, it was not a hypersonic missile, but a “spacecraft”, a “routine test to verify reusable technology.” That, he added, is “of great significance for reducing spacecraft costs” as well as “a convenient and cost-effective way to use space peacefully.”
Yet, as already noted by the FT, it is not clear why Beijing did not give news of the launch, as it usually does (albeit with concise announcements) for the tests of “peaceful” vehicles. This was the case in July, when the China aerospace science and technology corp (Casc, the main state company employed in the design, construction and use of space carriers) announced the launch of a “demonstrative and reusable” structure, which started from the Jiuquan satellite launch center (in the north-west of the country) and then landed at an airport 800 kilometers away, located in the Alxa League, within the autonomous region of Chinese Mongolia.
More details had arrived in September 2020, when Beijing announced (through its news agencies) the test of a “reusable experimental aircraft”. Also departing from Jiuquan, pushed into low Earth orbit (Leo) by the Chinese Long March 2F rocket, the craft had returned to earth two days later on a glide. On that occasion, Chen Hongbo, a Casc researcher, noted that “the next spacecraft will fly in the atmosphere like an airplane”, thus indicating a further development towards an aircraft capable of reaching space without the use of a carrier rocket but with only the use of the fuel present on board. On the other hand, there was no mention of a carrier rocket in the July communication, and therefore it cannot be excluded that it may be a different set-up than the one tested in September 2020.
On the other hand, there is a press release on the test reported by the Financial Times, which explicitly speaks of a “hypersonic glide vehicle”, ie a hypersonic glide missile, which would have missed the target by about 38 kilometers. Since it is a vector that re-enters the atmosphere beyond Mach 5 (therefore above 1.7 kilometers per second), it would have very different characteristics compared to a “reusable spacecraft”, a formula generally attributed to spaceplanes, capable of landing again like airplanes.
The issues on the table touch at least three aspects that deserve attention. First, the hypersonic rush. Second, the “peaceful” nature of the test declared by Beijing in the denial. Third, the attention still shown to reusable technologies. On the first point, the general said everything about these columnsMario Arpino , noting how the hypersonic dossier is part of a technological race that sees the People’s Republic well committed to eroding the advantage of the West. Now, regardless of the Chinese denial, the attention to hypersonic has been undeniable for years.
In 2019, the great protagonist of the parade for the 70th anniversary of the People’s Republic was the DF-17, of which the first announcement on a double test dates back to November 2017. It is a ballistic vector (Mrbm) that overcomes the atmosphere to re-enter it and acquire greater speed. Unlike traditional missiles of this type, however, the DF-17 is placed in its own category of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) since, after having re-entered the atmosphere at a narrower angle, it flies in glide by moving the final part. of the ballistic fall, all at hypersonic speed, higher than Mach 5. This makes the missile much more unpredictable, without losing maneuverability, for a range that, in the case of the DF-17, is estimated to reach 2 thousand kilometers carrying conventional warheads and nuclear. It is precisely the DF-17 that has convinced the United States to accelerate in the field of hypersonic missiles, also identified by NATO as “one of the technologies that will revolutionize the way of waging war”. It would have a range of up to 2,500 kilometers and an accuracy “in the order of meters”. Last year, the South China Morning Post reported on its deployment in southeast China. That Beijing is already testing new technologies in this category would not be so surprising. Last year, the South China Morning Post reported on its deployment in southeast China. That Beijing is already testing new technologies in this category would not be so surprising. Last year, the South China Morning Post reported on its deployment in southeast China. That Beijing is already testing new technologies in this category would not be so surprising.
The second issue concerns the alleged “peaceful” nature of the Chinese test. While admitting that the August test did not concern a hypersonic glide vector, one wonders whether it is really possible to attribute the adjective “peaceful” to a suborbital aircraft. In July, two American analysts, Taylor A. Lee and PW Singer, launched the warning on the DefenseOne columns: “China’s space program is more military than one might think.” As noted by the two, “the organizations of planning and direction of space, the ground infrastructure that support the space programs and the taikonauts themselves are all under the competence of the People’s Liberation Army.” Therefore, “understanding these connections is important for any cooperation plan with China in space, governmental and commercial”. Also because the border between the two appears particularly blurred. As Simone Dossi
explained, professor of International Relations of East Asia at the State University of Milan, non-resident research fellow of the Turin World Affairs Institute (T.wai), the aspect “deserves more attention” among those of the XIV Five-Year Plan of the Communist Party Chinese “is not so much the how much of military modernization, but the how”. In fact, he added, “a lot of attention has been paid in recent years to the so-called military-civil merger (jun-min ronghe), that is, to the integration between the defense sector and the civil sector (public and private) to reduce costs and facilitate processes of innovation “. This also happens in space, a sector on which Beijing has focused decisively.
This also concerns the mysterious “reusable vehicle” cited in the Beijing denial. If it were the spaceplane already tested in the previous months, it would again make sense to partner, ideally, with the American colleague X-37B, launched into orbit for the first time in September 2017 thanks to SpaceX’s Falcon 9 vector, and remained for 780 days of mission in space. Developed by Boeing, the spacecraft is 2.9 meters high, 8.9 meters wide and has a wingspan of 4.5 meters, for a total weight of 4,990 kg. Similarly to what happened in the Chinese case, even the US apparatuses did not disclose information about all the missions carried out in orbit. In a previous article for Formiche.net, the engineer and aerospace expert Marcello Spagnulohad underlined the importance of this type of aircraft: “The strategic role that this Pentagon drone will have in the future military architecture of the US Space Force should not be underestimated”. Among the hypothetical applications there are also purely military ones.
Finally, third aspect, the theme of reusability. “Many companies around the world have carried out similar experiments,” explained Zhao explaining the nature of the test, aimed at “verifying the reusable technology of the spacecraft.” The development finds its paternity in the revolution imprinted on access to space by Elon Muskand its SpaceX. In the aforementioned XIV Five-Year Plan of the Communist Party of China there is a strong push for the “commercial” development of the Chinese sector. The construction of a spaceport dedicated to supporting private space activities is expected, but also, by 2035, the development of a reusable super-heavy carrier, that is to say a rocket capable of transporting men and material for long-distance missions into space. period. The project is in line with a series of moves made by Beijing to facilitate and support its emerging commercial space sector, a sector that saw the first opening to private capital in 2014.
