All the moves of Turkey between NATO, Russia and Ukraine
In 2011 Tayyip Erdogan was opposed to both military operations and economic sanctions against the Libyan regime. “What business does NATO have in Libya
”, he asked. He seemed determined to keep out. It lasted a few days – the time of what controversy and his anger at the West-led air raids – for him to lift the opposition, siding with the Atlantic allies, eventually becoming a major player in the conflict.
And just one of the possible examples of the previous episodes broadcast by the Turkish leader. He intends to remain neutral and to mediate between the parties. But he doesn’t succeed for long. “On the contrary, with the escalation of the crisis and the formation of blocs, Ankara tends to take ever more radical decisions,” writes Hasim Tekines, who worked at the Turkish foreign ministry.
In the Russian invasion of Ukraine, “one of the most affected countries is Turkey, which has long enjoyed strong ties with both Moscow and Kiev,” notes Politico. For Dimitar Bechevis, a lecturer at the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies, Ankara’s delicate balance between its two partners “is becoming much more difficult to sustain as the fighting intensifies and the West increases pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin. As part of NATO and regional heavyweight, Turkey is under severe pressure to choose which side to take ”.
The mediator’s playbook, Ankara has already interpreted it. First Erdogan invited Putin and President Volodymyr Zelensky to Turkey with an offer of mediation. Without answer. Instead, the Antalya summit was held last Thursday, on the sidelines of the Diplomacy Forum, through Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu.He put two very high-level delegations around a table, led respectively by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his Ukrainian counterpart Dmytro Kuleba . The widely anticipated bankruptcy took place on time.
And now what to do
Siding with the United States and the EU, marrying their anti Putin sanctions – so far rejected – and the next moves – if any -, or maintaining a neutrality that has the flavor of an unlikely silence-assent to Russia
. the response to the conflict in Ukraine and for Turkey above all is a test for its future location in the hinge between Europe and Asia.
Ankara, like Moscow, and heir to a former empire. Turkey like Russia has a deep nationalist soul. Two nationalisms that distance the two countries in strategic interests, but bring them closer in temperament. To say: those who call themselves Social Democrats in Turkey defend the thesis defended by the far right in Europe on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Because most of those who claim to be Social Democrats in Turkey are actually nationalists. As revealed, for example, by the twitter position of Baris Yarkadas , the voice of the People’s Republican Party, the Turkish social democratic side.
Turkey feels totally autonomous in NATO. It has not imposed sanctions or closed airspace on Russia, although it condemned the invasion unambiguously. In the days leading up to February 24, Erdogan had asked for moderation and respect for international law.
Turkey bought the Russian S-400 missile defense system – a decision that has since complicated its relations with the United States – but sold its Bayraktar, long-range armed drones, to Ukraine. In December, Putin personally complained to Erdogan about the sale of drones.
In a geographically strategic position, it closed the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to Russian warships. Decision at the moment more symbolic: the ships have already entered and can leave. But, of course, the replacement of the fleet is prevented.
Multiple interests in strategic sectors. As ISPI photographs, Russia is Turkey’s largest gas supplier – over 33% of supplies. Russian company Rosatom is developing a Turkish nuclear power plant in southern Anatolia, which is expected to meet around 10% of electricity needs by 2025. Russia is also Turkey’s third largest trading partner with $ 34.7 billion in trade in 2021.
“Not negligible, in this sense – observes Limes – the fact that on March 4th the Kremlin decided to increase imports of agricultural products from Turkey, excluded from the list of hostile countries published on March 7th. It is a fundamental indicator of the state of relations between Ankara and Moscow, since the limitation on the import of Anatolian food is generally the first signal that Putin sends to Erdogan to express his dissatisfaction ”.
However, the elements of friction abound, which see the two former empires sitting on opposite stages in important theaters of history. The example of Syria is emblematic. Since 2011, Turkish politics has had a premise: to oust Assad, which Russia has successfully supported. The Syrian policy of Ankara has failed and that of Moscow has been successful.
A shared feeling among analysts is that Turkey fears Russia. For some, Russia’s behavior now presents Moscow as the common enemy of the West that “could turn [Turkey] into the ally it should be”. The Russian threat, after all, has always been a powerful catalyst for Westernization in Turkey.
An alternative point of view, given the burgeoning relations between Turkey and Russia, offers instead that Turkey is more likely to sit on the sidelines regarding this particular conflict. Of course: in contrast to his growing doubts about his relations with the United States and the European Union, direct Turkish-Russian relations have steadily developed. But some in Washington expect – hope – the return of Turkey, the prodigal son of NATO, as a member of good standing in the Alliance. Turkey, it is thought, is alarmed by the resurgence of Russian power, especially in the Black Sea. President Erdogan ‘s government then cultivated strong relations with Ukraine and would be shocked to see the country’s sovereignty violated by Turkey’s historic enemy.
In fact, the opposite seems more likely. According to Selim Koru , of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, “if Putin achieves a major military victory against Ukraine and is able to withstand the economic and diplomatic consequences, he will only accelerate Turkey’s transition to a post-NATO position. “.
Observes War on the rocks: “Unlike the Cold War, Ankara does not necessarily see the Russian revival as a threat. This is because Erdogan’s worldview, as well as the Turkish right as a whole, is much closer to that of Putin than to that of the Western liberal elites. This may seem irrelevant to policy makers, but it is the emotional background of the entire political apparatus, which shapes popular perceptions and strategic culture ”. The background in which Ankara’s transition to a post-NATO position could develop further.
Turkey benefited from joining the Alliance. Its army has been completely shaped by NATO culture, standards and technology. And it paid off the alliance, honoring its obligations by contributing to missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan and hosting NATO’s land command. War on the rocks continues: “His current policy is not to leave NATO, but rather to change perspective.”
Meanwhile, Turkey takes advantage of the contingency for its own active neutrality in the conflict: military support for Kiev, but no hostile action against Moscow. And he criticizes the UN. Erdoganat the Diplomacy Forum he did not send them to say: “When one of the parties to the conflict has become a permanent member with the right of veto (reference to Russia, ed), the role of the Security Council has been wasted and the system has failed. No measures were taken at the United Nations General Assembly to put an end to the conflicts ”. Words that more than just to Russia, sound like observations to the UN from a post-NATO Ankara without leaving NATO. In a phase where there is growing interest in collaborating on concrete projects and at least. to expand relations with China. Look how Moscow is doing.
This being the case, the immediate consideration of Turkey is economic. The war between Ukraine and Russia will be terrible for the already fragile Turkish economy. In addition to its common interests with Russia, Turkey also has agreements to import Ukrainian engines for some of its major weapon systems. Including materials for the T929 Atak attack helicopter and the Bayraktar drone. A nice dilemma.
At the moment we shouldn’t rule out more radical Turkish steps against Russia, but perhaps we shouldn’t expect new and more passionate American-Turkish relations either.
“In terms of expansionist ambitions, aggression, anti-Western sentiments and authoritarian character, Erdogan is not very different from Putin as a leader, albeit with a weaker military capacity. Like Putin, he is anxious to redraw his territorial boundaries and establish a large area of influence – writes the Fikra Forum of the Washington Institute -. Washington and Ankara may temporarily have congruent positions on some issues, even important ones, but the incompatible visions and interests of the two sides, not to mention the lack of mutual trust, make a real rapprochement unlikely ”.
