For strategic purposes it is of crucial importance for a military planner to analyze the pandemic as if it were a dress rehearsal of a future war with massive use of biological weapons. The analysis of General Vincenzo Camporini, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Defense
For historical and political purposes, it is certainly of fundamental importance to ascertain the origin of the virus that is causing the CoViD-19 pandemic, if it has a completely natural genesis or whether it is the result of genetic manipulations carried out in an outpatient clinic.
However, for strategic purposes the question becomes of secondary importance, while it assumes a decisive importance for a military planner to analyze the pandemic as if it were a dress rehearsal of a future war with massive use of biological weapons.
History tells us that the idea is certainly not new: in the past it was a fairly common practice to poison wells, also using cattle carrion, in order to spread diseases among the enemy troops, to reduce or annihilate their operational capabilities. Even fairly recent events tell us of wars in which, among the military, the number of those killed in combat was lower than those who died from diseases, as happened for example during the Crimean war.
In more recent times the problem has remained constantly on the agenda and the biological weapon has always been adequately considered even during the wars of the last century, with agents such as anthrax concretely inserted in the arsenals, to the point that every army has equipped with capabilities defined in military jargon with the acronym NBC, ie Nuclear, Bacteriological, Chemical, thus including the ability to operate in environments contaminated by various types of agents. Indeed some countries have developed this sensitivity more than others and today in the context of the Atlantic Alliance, for example, the availability of the experience gained by the army of the Czech Republic, formalized with the establishment of a multinational ‘Center of Excellence’, is precious. in the Vyskov base.
The events of the last two years, in which most countries have seen their economies compromised on the verge of collapse and therefore the ability to continue to be credible actors in international scenarios, have given clear and unequivocal evidence, which must constitute reason for reflection. In fact, a power hypothetically determined to assume a dominant position could achieve this aim by simultaneously developing a pathogen with high lethality, capable of spreading rapidly, and the appropriate countermeasures, in the form of adequate vaccines or other, with which to protect its population and the its own military instrument which would therefore not be difficult to overcome opposing forces weakened by a critical health situation.
The Western reaction to the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 and its rapid spread, with devastating effects, has been incredibly rapid, enabling the production in just over twelve months of a series of vaccines that have drastically reduced the lethality of the pathogen, an agent that in any case continues to keep the daily life and economic capacities of our countries in difficulty. But twelve months are a huge amount that could hardly be afforded in the face of a determined action such as the one summarily described, carefully planned and executed, accompanied by a classic military campaign by a hostile power. In all likelihood, the ability of the attacked countries to resist would be drastically reduced, as clearly demonstrated in the first months of the current pandemic: an American aircraft carrier deployed in the Pacific, the Roosevelt, was out of action for almost three weeks due to the spread of the virus in its crew, with a heavy disorientation of the entire US hierarchy. In fact, the commander of the aircraft carrier Brett Crozier was removed at the behest of Defense Secretary Elmer, who later apologized for it.
From episodes like this it is necessary to draw the lesson of the need to have ready adequate preventive measures, in order to ensure the operation of the military instrument in any circumstance, which requires investments in personnel, in equipment, even if in normal times these investments may appear redundant.
Another lesson to be learned from the events of these two years and relating to the integrity of supply chains: globalization has allowed cost optimization thanks to the possibility of delocalizing the production of low-tech components and subsets in countries where the cost of work is lower. However, the countries with the highest technological level have paid for this economic advantage with an unacceptable vulnerability of the production chains, to the point of having to depend on China for the supply of very simple protective masks. This must no longer happen, not in the sense that production that is uneconomic must be maintained at all costs, but that for any value chain it is necessary to identify the critical elements, for which it is necessary to maintain a potential ability to promptly regain possession of the integrity of the processes. Here, too, investments are needed, which may appear unproductive, but which are nothing more than the premium of an insurance, without which one would be at the mercy not only of accidental and fortuitous events, but above all of those who wanted to exploit these vulnerabilities for their own strategic designs, designs that would jeopardize our social models, if not our freedoms.
Preparing for the worst can be expensive, but it is certainly less expensive than the price of the consequences of unpreparedness.
