The civil revolution in Belarus paradoxically strengthened the relationship between Lukashenko and Putin which in recent months had been on the verge of breaking up due to the diatribes on gas supplies and the winks of Minsk in Washington. Enzo Reale’s in-depth analysis for daily Atlantico
The regime’s strategy in Belarus towards visible opposition representatives now follows a consolidated pattern: first intimidation, then detention / kidnapping, finally deportation. Lukashenko’s goal is to present himself at the next meeting with Putin as the only possible interlocutor, aware that if the Kremlin had a credible alternative it would probably do without him. Kolesnikova had just founded a party (Together), and that was the straw that broke the camel’s back. At this point, it is difficult not to relate Navalny’s poisoning to the situation in Belarus.
Now, in the two countries that Putin would like to be united forever, all the most uncomfortable opponents are out of the game or outside national borders. Time will tell how much the beheading of leaders will affect the evolution of anti-regime protests. For the moment, the popular thrust in Minsk seems to draw strength from the repression and the consequences of the attack in Navalny on an altogether marginal movement in Russian society are still to be assessed. What can be said with certainty is that, whether it is a question of orders from above or of situations born of “environmental conditioning”, the persecution of Navalny and Kolesnikova fully reveals the moral corruption of their respective governments and their distress in the manage direct challenges to power.
The civil revolution in Belarus paradoxically strengthened the relationship between Lukashenko and Putin which, in recent months, had been on the verge of breaking up several times due to the diatribes on gas supplies and the winks of Minsk in Washington. The two do not love each other, it is obvious, but today more than ever they need each other. The main problem is that this dependence is also evident to a population that is not in principle animated by anti-Russian sentiments but nevertheless aware that Moscow’s intervention is the greatest obstacle to the fall of the regime at home. The awakening of a national sentiment among Belarusians is the child of this awareness: if the struggle for freedom does not coincide with a real national independence, the battle cannot be considered won. If Moscow represented a democratic model to be inspired by, the revolution would have already been completed. The reality, however, is another and a nation tired of a dictatorship which, except for a brief interlude between 1991 and 1994, has lasted uninterruptedly for almost a hundred years (first the USSR, then Lukashenko) moral and political support from the European Union.
For the moment, Brussels refuses to sanction Lukashenko, hoping to keep an unspecified “channel of dialogue” open. Putin on the other hand is aware of the need for a transition in Minsk, a transfer of power that is favorable to his own interests and that allows him, in the medium term, to achieve the union between the two state entities, thanks to which to extend the share of Russian influence in the final phase of his interminable mandate. It is superfluous to underline how far this action plan is from the wishes of the Belarusians who are risking their physical safety against a regime willing to do anything to perpetuate itself, even to sell off a national sovereignty which, in any case, is already proving to usurp.
To achieve this, Moscow needs to keep Lukashenko in power today. The strategy is already operational, as evidenced by the dispatch of intelligence agents, IT technicians, national security consultants and propaganda officials, who have effectively occupied Belarusian state television, taking the place of a large number of resigning colleagues . The staff of RT (Russia Today) arrived in Minsk on Tuesday, led by Margarita Simonyan, the true eminence gray (but also dressed in green) behind the (un) informative galaxy of the Kremlin. The official mission was to interview Lukashenko, provide him with an international stage, prepare the Russians for what is to come. It seems the president appreciated, considering the smiles and hugs immortalized in a series of final photos that all of Belarus could see. In this context, the constitutional reform that Lukashenko said he was willing to consider would be presented as a concession to the opposition, giving Moscow time to organize pro-Russian parties and organizations capable of guaranteeing control of the process and avoiding any sliding of Minsk into European and Western orbit. From here to the political and economic integration between the two entities, the step would be relatively short, without the need for direct or proxy armed action, on the Ukrainian model. giving Moscow time to organize pro-Russian parties and organizations capable of guaranteeing control of the process and avoiding any sliding of Minsk into European and Western orbit. From here to the political and economic integration between the two entities, the step would be relatively short, without the need for direct or proxy armed action, on the Ukrainian model. giving Moscow time to organize pro-Russian parties and organizations capable of guaranteeing control of the process and avoiding any sliding of Minsk into European and Western orbit. From here to the political and economic integration between the two entities, the step would be relatively short, without the need for direct or proxy armed action, on the Ukrainian model.
A slow-fire annexation that has to deal with three variables: the first is the unpredictability of Lukashenko, who now finds himself in a dead end and with no room for maneuver, but does not necessarily accept all that willingly. that it be imposed on him: for the moment, despite heavy interference, the KGB and the armed forces are still under his control; the second is the resistance of a population increasingly aware of its rights and its national identity, which will hardly accept the transition from an autochthonous authoritarianism to one imposed from outside; the third is the acquiescence of Western democracies, on which Putin has substantially been able to count up to now, but which the overlap of the Navalny case with the Belarusian crisis is putting to the test. It is on these scenarios that the attention and diplomatic effort of the European Union should focus, rather than on unlikely (at least to date) armed interventions. Failing to understand the Kremlin’s real intentions or, worse, to support them would mean betraying the hopes for freedom of the Belarusians, who are taking on their shoulders the full weight of a civil revolution which, whatever the outcome, is destined to represent a watershed in the history of Belarus.
We will witness the gradual erosion of the autocracy or the Moscow shore will prevail where in the end everything is decided
Lukashenko does not give up, he takes care of the dirty work, shows himself to the crowd a rifle in his hand but has his ear turned to the Kremlin for instructions. It does not have a territorially articulated power structure or an organized party base under it, state-owned enterprises and official unions are forced to silence but strikes and protests have revealed its mood, even the Catholic Church is under attack, as demonstrated the ban on re-entry imposed on Archbishop Tadeush Kandrusievich: all his power depends on the security services of which he is, at the same time, master and hostage. And as in a tragic game of mirrors, this declining but violent regime, halfway between Brezhnevian stagnation and South American military dictatorship, prefigures the barbarization of the great neighbor, prisoner of a system that Putin has armored and, perhaps, condemned to a common fate of decay. Unless, in the meantime, something happens there too.
(Extract of an article published on atlanticoquotidiano.it; here the full version)
