How and why the United States decided to leave Afghanistan. The analysis by Francesco D’Arrigo, director of the Italian Institute for Strategic Studies
Reading the agreement signed in Doha by the Trump administration, the title already shows the embarrassment of the talks between the global superpower, the United States, with a insurgent group: Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America. (“Agreement to bring peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America”).
Analyzing the political decisions determined by the popular mandate entrusted by the Americans to the last two US administrations – “end wars forever” – and the consequences of the agreement with the Taliban that led to the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, in contrast to the media mainstream where there is talk of “absolute catastrophe” of “end of the Atlantic Alliance” of “Chinese domination”, of “tarnishing of Western values” and other disastrous premonitions, three elements should be highlighted:
- the Taliban have not defeated anyone. The United States was not defeated in combat by the enemy, but with their decisions they (momentarily) weakened their leadership;
- there has been no “Intelligence Failure”, no Intelligence failure;
- Afghanistan did not fall because it never existed. Afghanistan is not a state as we westerners understand it (body with territorial power, which exercises this power on an original basis, in a stable and effective way and in full independence from other bodies – Treccani). It is a territory with a civilization that stopped in the Middle Ages, inhabited by quarrelsome tribes, ethnic groups, Islamic confessions and warlords who maneuver young men with Russian Kalashnikovs and now also with very modern American weapons.
Before us, the Soviets wanted Afghans to pretend to be Communists. We Westerners wanted them to pretend to be Democrats. But Afghans are not ‘Afghan’ citizens: they are Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Baloch, Hazara, Sunni and Shiite Muslims. Everything else is just an attempt to interpret that part of the world according to our values.
The tragic and rapid cession of Kabul to the Taliban cannot therefore be cataloged as a failure of NATO or even of intelligence: Intelligence has no decision-making power but often represents a convenient scapegoat for decisions made due to wrong political considerations. Intelligence is an imprecise science that at the end of an in-depth analysis provides the political decision-maker with different scenarios according to conditions present at that moment and with constantly changing elements. In the case in question, the projections and risk levels of carrying out the retreat of Western troops varied according to the US military presence, Afghan internal dynamics, the planning and preventive implementation of a civilian evacuation plan, to the credibility of the Taliban’s commitment to respect what was negotiated with the Trump administrations before and after Biden. The scenarios for a safe withdrawal ranged from those in which the United States kept approximately 5,000 military personnel, most of the military and intelligence operational bases and existing airports operational to ensure the securing of weapons and the evacuation of the tens of thousands. of Western citizens. Instead, the retreat was decided with the mere presence of about 2,500 US troops, absolutely insufficient to maintain the bases and above all the operational airports. The choices determined by internal political factors have led President Biden to not adequately consider the assessments and scenarios of the Intelligence Agencies,
A strategic retreat, from a military point of view, is a retreat of the troops to evade an offensive by the enemy or an attempt to encircle it, but it can also be a strategy to be able to settle on better defensive positions and to counterattack in the case of retaliation against their own military or civilians to be evacuated. The withdrawal of all military occupation troops such as that ordered by President Biden is a strategic retreat, but resulting from political rather than military reasons. The Taliban were unable to pose a threat to the allied forces.
The lack of adequate planning and equally meticulous implementation of an evacuation plan for tens of thousands of American citizens and coalition partners, including all non-diplomatic civilian personnel, trainers, consultants, medical personnel, support and the thousands of Afghan citizens who in these long 20 years of war have collaborated and believed in the West, have created the conditions for the realization of one of the worst possible scenarios, foreseen by the CIA, but considered unlikely by President Biden and his National Security Staff.
That said, anyone who thinks the US is abandoning its allies and giving up its global leadership role is very wrong. The disastrous operational management of the withdrawal from Afghanistan represents a moment of crisis for the Biden administration and a geopolitical shock, but many will have to worry about the birth of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
Starting with China, which despite the intense media campaign and strategic influence against the US is probably the power most concerned about the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, much more than it has publicly hinted at. Beijing will have to invest huge resources to monitor the actions and repercussions of Taliban rule on Chinese security, political and economic interests. China has maintained an open channel of communication with the Taliban over the years, but despite this it has not yet formalized diplomatic relations with the newly established Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Following the announcement of the planned US withdrawal, Beijing sought reassurance in meetings with Taliban delegations on diplomatic and security issues.
The potential economic interests that could derive from investments by the Belt and Road Initiative and from mining, however, will have to be carefully balanced with the multiple risk factors that the dramatic Afghan situation poses today, as well as in the past. Beijing will also have to commit to obtaining guarantees from the Taliban so that Afghanistan does not become a safe haven for terrorist organizations – such as the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkmenistan. Another risk factor for China for developing relations with the Taliban is the possibility that Afghanistan could be used as a base for attacks on its western province of Xinjiang, due to the way Uighurs are treated. It is also unlikely that Beijing will intervene militarily to fill a security deficit or to protect its interests in Afghanistan. Previous attacks on New Silk Road projects or Chinese personnel overseas have not so far convinced the Chinese government to involve the People’s Liberation Army. The experience of the Soviet army and the US is a dramatic warning of the dangers of involvement in a conflict in Afghanistan. But, more importantly, Beijing’s military priority lies in the East. Recent developments in Afghanistan represent a very serious concern for China – due to the strategic shift of Washington’s military engagement from the Middle East to the Indo- Pacific, and to China itself. Previous attacks on New Silk Road projects or Chinese personnel overseas have not so far convinced the Chinese government to involve the People’s Liberation Army. The experience of the Soviet army and the US is a dramatic warning of the dangers of involvement in a conflict in Afghanistan. But, more importantly, Beijing’s military priority lies in the East. Recent developments in Afghanistan represent a very serious concern for China – due to the strategic shift of Washington’s military engagement from the Middle East to the Indo- Pacific, and to China itself. Previous attacks on New Silk Road projects or Chinese personnel overseas have not so far convinced the Chinese government to involve the People’s Liberation Army. The experience of the Soviet army and the US is a dramatic warning of the dangers of involvement in a conflict in Afghanistan. But, more importantly, Beijing’s military priority lies in the East. Recent developments in Afghanistan represent a very serious concern for China – due to the strategic shift of Washington’s military engagement from the Middle East to the Indo- Pacific, and to China itself. The experience of the Soviet army and the US is a dramatic warning of the dangers of involvement in a conflict in Afghanistan. But, more importantly, Beijing’s military priority lies in the East. Recent developments in Afghanistan represent a very serious concern for China – due to the strategic shift of Washington’s military engagement from the Middle East to the Indo- Pacific, and to China itself. The experience of the Soviet army and the US is a dramatic warning of the dangers of involvement in a conflict in Afghanistan. But, more importantly, Beijing’s military priority lies in the East. Recent developments in Afghanistan represent a very serious concern for China – due to the strategic shift of Washington’s military engagement from the Middle East to the Indo- Pacific, and to China itself.
The strategic scenario for Russia is different, as it could exploit Biden’s current political weakening to try to recover relations with the West and especially with some European countries. The Russian government in this chaotic phase flaunts calm and neutrality and the ability of its Kabul embassy to operate without limitation – under the apparent protection of the Taliban – represents an expression of power and influence in stark contrast to current political capabilities. diplomats of Western governments. Although the Taliban remain a terrorist organization for the Russian Federation,
But even for Moscow there is no shortage of reasons for great concern for the evolution of events. We all remember how in the 1990s Islamic extremism from Afghanistan tried to undermine not only Central Asia but Russia itself. Partly for this reason, President Putin never thwarted US intervention in Afghanistan. For a time, Russia and the United States even shared a commitment to fight international terrorism. Even before the Taliban took over Kabul, Moscow had begun to anticipate the re-emergence of risks similar to those experienced during its last period of rule, highlighting the threat posed by the resumption of massive drug flows and jihadist militants.
Turkey also finds itself involved in this new crisis which will force it to implement a shared refugee settlement policy if it wants to limit irregular immigration into the country and continue to receive substantial economic resources from the EU. The attempts to take on a role in the regional chessboard of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have been evident since the beginning of the crisis in Afghanistan, expressing not entirely negative positions on the advance of the Taliban, showing interest in courting them and exploiting the settlement quickly. of the new Islamic regime, making it clear that he does not want to hear about the refugee crisis, it is none of his business. Certainly President Erdogan will seek to strengthen his credibility with the Biden administration and other Western partners by using his close relations with Qatar and Pakistan (both of which have cultivated close ties with senior Taliban officials) to attempt to establish himself as a mediator between the Taliban administration and the West. For the Turkish premier, the crisis in Afghanistan may represent an opportunity to recover some of the legitimacy lost due to foreign policy errors in recent years, but in the absence of a clear geopolitical framework and without the coverage of a NATO mission, Turkey too faces a dangerous prospect with a Taliban Afghanistan.
In this new scenario, which will also be conditioned by the strategies of other regional powers such as Iran, India, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and hoping that Europe will also strike a blow, the media momentum of which the Taliban had they have even received need from the direct cooperation of their enemies, through an effective cybernetic propaganda campaign unexpectedly fueled by American Big Tech. These days, thousands of profiles on social platforms spread Taliban propaganda and disinformation messages, even making a photo that compares Kabul to Iwo Jima go viral, depicting four Taliban in camouflage clothing raising the flag of the Islamic Emirate as the Americans did in Japan . Through their media nexus made up of videos, social networks, deep web and dark web, in addition to attracting hundreds of thousands of new followers, the Taliban radicalize potential followers and successfully manipulate Western media and politicians, with depictions and “soothing perceptions” of their offensive. “Relaxing perceptions” not supported by the history of the Taliban movement, by the Islamic fundamentalist ideology of this organization, by the denial of fundamental rights and by the images arriving from Kabul these days.
The Taliban are an organization that cannot be considered by the international community as a “regime of relaxation” and not even a reliable interlocutor with whom to negotiate and recognize politically. Their eternal war, Jihad, will continue. Whether we will still be in Afghanistan or not.
Al Qaeda and Isis will return to operate from Afghanistan. As well as countless other jihadist fighters.
We Westerners have never really understood what Jihad is, and the interpretation of armed militancy is one of the many positions of Islamic strategic doctrine.
And we will probably be attacked again in one form or another. But this does not mean that the West has surrendered to the triumph of the most ferocious obscurantism.
