How Germany moves on defense after Russia’s war in Ukraine. Gianni Bonvicini’s analysis for International Affairs
Russia’s war against Ukraine is creating a radical geopolitical upheaval. We return to the Bismarkian policy of confrontation between powers, to the detriment of a collapsed multilateral order. Do not deceive, in fact, the massive vote of the UN Assembly against Russian aggression. The United Nations can only be moved by a vote in the Security Council, where Russia has the right of veto. So no possibility of negotiation by the highest global authority. Just a political message. Nor are they substantially moved by the CSCE or the Council of Europe, which counts both countries among its members. Therefore, the international scenario changes with a visible, further weakening of multilateral organizations. It is therefore the individual countries that take on the task of countering,
The most striking case in this direction is certainly that of Germany. Until 24 February 2022, the date of the start of the war, the myth of the ostpolitik inaugurated by Willy Brandt in the 1970s continued to survive in German politics. It was then an opening to dialogue with the Soviet Union, on the basis of the German recognition of the horrendous massacres committed by the Nazis in Eastern Europe. With the arrival of Vladimir Putin in power, Germany’s attitude had not changed. On the one hand, efforts were made to preach respect for human rights and freedoms in Russia, on the other hand they continued to cultivate business with Moscow in all fields, from that of technology transfer, also useful for strengthening Russian military power, to that of the construction of gas and oil pipelines,
Yet, in the meantime, there was the occupation of part of Georgia by Russian tanks, the annexation of Crimea, the destruction by aerial bombing of Aleppo and Homs in Syria and the attempts of poisoning and killing of major opponents in Russia. Not even Putin’s 2021 article on the rebirth of imperial Russia has worried the German establishment that much. Business continued without changing anything. The new Chancellor Olaf Scholz therefore found himself facing the preparations for the invasion of Ukraine with the weight of a German position, largely supported by Angela Merkel, now unsustainable both in front of Russia and the rest of Europe.
At first Scholz appeared uncertain and silent. He was the last of the great European leaders to go to the court of “Tsar” Putin. But then he decided to change the register and to operate a Zeitenwende, that is, a historical turning point in the confrontation with Moscow, abruptly abandoning the ambiguous policy of Angela Merkel. First of all, he blocked the official opening of Nord Stream 2, the new pipeline of the Baltic Sea that goes directly from Moscow to Germany. He then expelled former Chancellor Gerhard Schroder from his Socialist Party (SPD) who, scandalously, had for decades agreed to work for Moscow in the lucrative new pipeline business.
But after February 24, in a half-hour speech to the Bundenstag, Scholz made the real quantum leap in German politics. Increase in defense spending from 1.5% to 2% of GDP (as NATO and the Americans have been asking for years), doubling up to 100 billion euros of investments in armaments for the Bundeswehr and, above all, for the sending weapons to the Ukrainian resistance, thereby modifying Berlin’s policy of not providing military aid in conflict areas. In short, a Copernican reform that will weigh heavily on Germany’s role in Europe and in the world. An economic power, but a political dwarf, which feels obliged to transform itself into an international player of great importance and power.
If this is one of the consequences of Putin’s absurd war, there is no doubt that it is to be counted among the political defeats of the Kremlin leader: he has suddenly lost one of his most important supporters and interlocutors in Europe. Of course, the German turnaround can be pleasing in this particular historical juncture of war against Ukraine and European democracy, but for the future it is not great news for us Western Europeans either. A great and powerful Germany is not exactly a good memory, and for this reason the German move must be seen and channeled as soon as possible in the perspective of a strengthening of the European Union.
It must be a perspective that makes room for a common defense policy, a goal that the Union has been pursuing in vain since 1952. Not so much and not just to create a European army, but to give substance to a real European political government. Government that in this crisis has dramatically failed and that has had to delegate relations with Moscow to individual national leaders. We therefore need a European Zeitenwende today and not just a German one. Let’s take advantage of it. The time has come.
