Umberto Profazio’s analysis for International Affairs on the southern front of Libya
On May 31, the foreign ministers of Chad, Libya, Niger and Sudan signed a security cooperation protocol in N’Djamena, Chad. The meeting, which was attended by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Libyan Government recognized by the international community Mohamed Taher Siala, aims to strengthen controls along the common borders, in order to counter illicit trafficking and to limit the cross-border movements of the various groups present in the ‘area. According to official sources, the protocol provides for the establishment of mixed patrols to guard the desert borders between the four countries, as well as the creation of a command and control center to direct operations. An intergovernmental body holds periodic meetings to assess the progress of operations, with the possibility of taking advantage of assistance and support from third countries.
The agreement follows the meeting held in Niamey, Niger, on April 3, in which Chad, Libya, Niger and Sudan agreed to establish a cooperation mechanism for border security. On the occasion, the four countries expressed serious concerns about the situation in southern Libya, which has become “a hotbed of continuous threats to the security of the four countries”. THE BATTLE OF SABHA
From both the N’Djamena and Niamey meetings, the fear of the spread of the Libyan crisis in an already largely destabilized and fragile area such as that of the Sahel is evident. Seven years after the revolution that put an end to the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya still lacks legitimate and unified institutions, the victim of a process of fragmentation on a regional and local basis that seems irreversible at the moment. This process has had negative effects not only along the coastal strip, which is more populous and more covered by the local and regional media, but also in the vast desert hinterland of Fezzan, from where only a few and fragmentary news arrives.
Sabha, where tribal tensions again escalated into armed clashes at the end of January, was undoubtedly the epicenter of the conflict. The clashes, which pitted the Arab tribe of the Awlad Suliman against the ethnic minority of the Tebu, continued in the following months, causing numerous victims. The crisis has shown all the limits of international diplomatic action, whose efforts have very often produced agreements signed abroad which in Libya almost always remain a dead letter. An example is the reconciliation agreement signed on 31 March 2017 in Rome between Awlad Suliman, Tebu and Tuareg, the failure of which provided Misrata’s intelligence chief Ismail Shukri an opportunity to complain about foreign interference in Libya and their perverse effects on the social fabric of the country.HAFTAR’S COOPTATION ATTEMPTS
Although the Sabha conflict has a clear local dimension, it has aroused the interest of the main actors in the national confrontation. As in September 2017 in Sabratha, General Khalifa Haftar also tried to co-opt local militias in Sabha in an attempt to extend his influence beyond Cyrenaica. His attentions have turned to the Sixth Brigade, made up mostly of Awlad Suliman. However, the announcement made on May 10 that the Sixth Brigade was now an integral part of the Libyan National Army (ENL) proved counterproductive. Surprised and annoyed, the Tebu militiamen conquered Fort Elena, headquarters of the Sixth Brigade, removing it from Sabha and taking control of the city.
The defeat represented an important setback for Haftar, whose forces, engaged in the offensive on Derna, evidently did not bear the weight of two simultaneous battles on two so distant fronts. Under pressure on the southern flank, the Enl has frayed, losing distance between its positions and providing the opportunity for militias opposed to it to launch new attacks. The May 31 raid against the Tamanhent air base, not far from Sabha, was a serious alarm bell. Haftar’s forces managed to repel the offensive, accusing the Benghazi Defense Brigades (BdB) of being responsible for the attack. THE INTERLACEMENT OF JIHADISM, FOREIGN MILITIES AND MERCENARIESOften accused of being part of the terrorist galaxy present in Libya, the BdB would have relied on some foreign militias stationed in Fezzan, where the presence of opposition groups from neighboring countries is now confirmed. Among these, an important role has been played in recent years by the Front pour l’ternance et la concorde au Tchad (Fact), which used the vast desert areas of southern Libya to establish bases and training camps. Considered close to the Islamist factions in Libya and therefore contrary to Haftar’s forces, the Fact has nevertheless reached a truce with the ELN.
However, the hostilities continued with the Conseil du Commandement Militaire pour la Salut de la Republique (CCMSR), a formation born from an offshoot of the Fact and like the latter present in Libya. Following a series of airstrikes against his positions in the Tarbu area, in March the CCMSR also accused Chadian President Idriss Deby of having “contracted out” the fight against the Chadian armed opposition in Libya to the ENL. , allying with Haftar.
The CCMSR’s accusations bring out another aspect of the conflict in Libya, often overlooked: the intertwining of alliances that bind the various Libyan factions to state and non-state actors present along the southern borders. In addition to the relevant phenomenon of mercenaries, many of whom are present not only in Sabha but also in other theaters of the Libyan conflict, one can also note the support given to Haftar by the various Sudanese opposition groups. These include not only the Justice and Equality Movement (Jem), but also the Sudan Liberation Movement-Minni Minawi (Slm-MM): Sudanese sources have recently confirmed the arrival in Sudan of an ENL delegation to discuss with the ‘Slm-MM sending new fighters to Libya in support of Haftar’s forces, in addition to those already present, up to 1,000 units.LINES ON THE SAND
In light of the frenetic activity of terrorist groups, transnational criminal networks and foreign militias along Libya’s southern borders, it is clear that the protocol signed on May 31 in N’Djamena is an attempt by Chad, Niger and Sudan to to guard against instability in southern Libya. On several occasions, the leaders of neighboring countries have expressed concern about the possible return of armed opposition groups present in the area, up to the point of pushing President Deby in January 2017 to close the border with Libya and to declare the border area a military zone for the fear of possible infiltration by militants and terrorist groups.
However, on the occasion several doubts were expressed on the possibility of being able to close a notoriously porous border along a vast desert area such as that between Chad and Libya, difficult to control even for the Chadian troops, considered among the best prepared in the area. With the protocol signed in N’Djamena, the hope is that the joint effort between the different states will allow a more effective monitoring of this area and its borders, real lines on the sand, where, away from prying eyes, we continue to play an important game not only for Libya but also for the whole Sahel.
Article published on International Affairs
