An intervention force of five thousand soldiers ready to be mobilized in a flexible and interoperable way, with headquarters located in Brussels. This would be the proposal for the formation of a contingent directly dependent on the European Union that emerges from the latest draft of the Strategic Compass, the compass with which the EU should indicate the stages for the construction of an autonomous defense capacity. Corriere della Sera reports it today, specifying that the document should be presented to the Commission next Wednesday by the High Representative for security policy, Josep Borell . Last week, the same numbers had been feared by Bloomberg. THE NUMBERS
On the other hand, speaking before the Defense Commission of the Chamber and Senate in mid-October, the president of the EU Military Committee, General Claudio Graziano had illustrated the hypothesis of a Joint Eu entry force: “A multinational military formation of a joint forces, made up of a variable number of assets “. The number of personnel identified by the general was also around five / six thousand soldiers, an estimate based on the average size of Western contingents employed in operation in recent years, the approximate size of a brigade. LACK OF POLITICAL WILL
Beyond the technical-operational considerations, the amount of resources and personnel is secondary to the will of effective employment of the EU. Again according to Graziano: “Net of all the enabling assets, what is necessary is a clear and firm political will of the member countries”. More: “Without a univocal convergence of the member states towards the strengthening of common security and defense, it becomes superfluous to reflect on possible common military instruments and on the need to equip themselves with any European military capability”. The risk is that any defense initiative, regardless of the resources put in place, remains on paper, as was the fate of the European Battlegroups, designed starting in 2005 but never really used. FOUR DOMAINS
The focus, therefore, rather than on the numbers of the intervention force, should be on the document as a whole, a fundamental step to follow up on that level of ambition enshrined in 2016 with the EU’s global strategy, that is to become a global security provider. In fact, the Strategic Compass was born from the formal invitation of the EU Council, in June 2020, addressed to the High Representative, to develop together with the Member States a document that could “allow to strengthen and better guide the implementation of the level of ambition of Europe, a descendant of the Eu Global Strategy ”, released in 2016. Therefore, the main intent is to tackle the political issue, defining common lines on four areas: crisis management, capacity development, resilience and partnership. In this sense,THE ITALIAN MOMENT
This is why, despite the uncertainties, the arrival of the Strategic Compass will represent an important step for European common defense projects. It could be a particularly favorable moment for Italy to affirm its leadership on the issue. With Angela Merkel ‘s farewell to politics , our country is a candidate to lead the project to strengthen continental projects, also being able to count on the international leadership of Mario Draghi. The acceleration is expected from January, when Paris will take over the presidency of the EU Council, for which it has already promised a summit of leaders and government all for the common defense. And yet, for France the presidential elections are approaching, an element that will have a weight in the management of the European semester.
In the meantime, Italy has collected the validation of its line in the delicate relationship between the Atlantic Alliance and the EU in the field of defense. On the sidelines of the G20 at the end of October, during the meeting in Rome between Joe Biden and Mario Draghi first, and between Biden and Emmanuel Macron later, the median way, responsible, also promoted by Italy with Lorenzo Guerini, established itself:yes to European Defense, but always in synergy with the Alliance. THE TRANSATLANTIC APPROACH
This affirmation had already come from the previous NATO ministerial, with the head of the Pentagon Lloyd Austin arriving in Brussels among his European colleagues. On that occasion, a bilateral agreement with the French Florence Parly paves the way for the subsequent Biden-Macron meeting, preparatory to overcoming the fracture generated by the Aukus once and for all. The US president reaffirmed the “iron” commitment to the Atlantic Alliance, and a position favorable to the European defense commitments, always if understood “as a complement to NATO”. With the resumption of cordiality Emmanuel Macron, who has always been an advocate of the “hard line” of a European defense completely independent from NATO (and therefore from the USA), could be led to accept a line of compromise.
